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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the subjective experiences of New Zealand men who identify as gay 
and Christian. In particular, the study questions why gay men attend churches that have 
traditionally not welcomed or supported them. A small number of international studies 
have investigated gay men who have left the Church but there are few studies of those who 
stay. This research uses the work of Michel Foucault to theorise the contours of gay 
Christianity. Foucault‘s work has been little used in the sociology of religion. Semi-
structured interviews were undertaken with twelve men who identified as gay and 
Christian. Transcripts were examined using theoretically based thematic analysis, and three 
resulting themes are explored. The first theme describes religious exclusion of gay men 
and the value of supportive networks for gay Christians. The second theme theorises the 
concept of religious belief as both a type of knowledge/power and a practice, as well as 
exploring connections between religion and power. The third theme focuses on 
subjectivity, analysing ways in which those interviewed constructed an integrated gay and 
Christian self. Church attendance by gay men is attributed to three factors summarised as 
reasons of faith, reasons of fellowship and reasons of identity. These findings contribute to 
academic literature concerning religion, gay identity and Foucault, and there is scope for 
further research in these areas. The use of Foucault‘s work in this way may contribute to 
theoretical and methodological developments in the sociology of religion. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
“I definitely am a Christian believer …I have a really strong belief that Christ is 
my saviour and that he died to save me.” 
– Kelvin, one of the men interviewed for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Anthony Venn-Brown resigned as pastor of a large Australian pentecostal church 
few suspected the struggle he had been through. But in spite of his highly successful 
career, the Assemblies of God could not accept what was seen as an almost unfathomable 
sin– Venn-Brown was homosexual. ―According to my belief system,‖ writes Venn-Brown 
(2004:11), ―being a Christian and a homosexual was not possible. The two were 
incompatible, in total opposition, in fact.‖ 
 
Christian churches are often regarded as destructive for gay men and women. For example, 
when Melissa Wilcox heard about a friend who had joined an LGBT
1
 Christian church, she 
wrote, ―I could not fathom why any self-respecting feminist lesbian would want to be 
involved with a religion so heavily implicated in the battles against women‘s and LGBT 
rights‖ (Wilcox, 2003: 10). For both insiders and outsiders the idea of a homosexual 
Christian seems impossible. In light of such opposition Bouldrey (1995) and 
Schallenberger (1998) agree that for religious homosexuals the question is whether they 
can claim a place in the church or remain marginalised and estranged from organised 
religion. However, I have met gay men who remain active in the Christian Church
2 
, even 
                                               
1
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender. 
2 Where ―Church‖ is used for brevity, the entire group of Christian churches is intended. Also see the 
definition of terms in chapter two. 
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in denominations traditionally regarded as conservative. While I do not identify as either 
Christian or gay, I have a number of friends in both communities. In recent years I have 
met a number of Christians who see nothing wrong with homosexuality, some of whom are 
gay or lesbian themselves. The lives of these people captured my interest and led to the 
present study. 
 
In New Zealand and internationally there are studies which document negative Church-gay 
discourses. However, this research looks at an anomaly– gay men who come out to the 
Church and who stay in the Church. My particular question asks why they stay– it seems 
fairly clear why one would leave. What do they get out of religious faith. What discourses 
influence them as gay and Christian? How do they create themselves as religious– and 
gay– subjects? To answer these questions I interviewed twelve men who identified as both 
gay and Christian, and who regularly attended a Christian church. This thesis documents 
the results. 
 
Being gay in the Christian churches has often meant a process of coming to terms with 
staying in an often hostile situation (Hunt, 2009: 14). Some gay people opt to stay in the 
church without ―coming out‖. Ellison (2009: 2, emphasis original) writes, ―for most gay 
women and men, coming out in the church has meant coming out of the church‖. This was 
not the case with the men in this study; most of them were ―out‖ to the churches they 
attend, even though many of these churches would traditionally not have accepted openly 
gay members. 
 
The interview transcripts for this research were analysed using themes developed from 
extensive reading of the theoretical work of Michel Foucault. Foucault was initially chosen 
from personal interest; I had adopted him as a theorist I wanted to thoroughly understand. 
Somewhat fortuitously, I discovered Foucault has been little used in sociology of religion. 
Thus the current research is an attempt at a Foucauldian-influenced view of contemporary 
Christianity, as well as the particular challenges faced by homosexual Christians. In a late 
interview Foucault said: 
 
 ―I would like to understand how certain sexual behaviours become problems at a 
given moment, give rise to analyses, constitute objects of knowledge.‖ 
 (Foucault, 1982c: 368). 
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Assuming that homosexuality can be considered a ―sexual behaviour‖3, for Christian 
churches this behaviour has become a problem. In Foucault‘s view, this problem has 
become an object of knowledge– what Christianity ―knows‖ about homosexuality. The 
present study attempts to analyse the ―problem‖ of gay Christians, and perhaps generate 
further knowledge. Foucault wrote comparatively little on religion, yet he did leave some 
significant pointers, particularly from what has been referred to as his later ―ethical‖ period 
(Oksala, 2007). In this research Foucault‘s concepts of discourse, power/knowledge, 
techniques of the self, and the subject form the basis for a Foucauldian theory of religion. 
 
By way of background, New Zealand society has undergone significant social changes 
around homosexuality in the last thirty years. The Homosexual Law Reform Bill (1986) 
decriminalised homosexual acts and the Human Rights Act (1993) extended protection 
from discrimination to non-heterosexuals. More recently the Civil Union Act (2004) gave 
marriage-like rights to gay (and other) couples wishing to commit in this way. During the 
writing of this thesis the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act (2013) was 
passed, allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry in the same way as traditional 
heterosexual unions. It is unclear whether there has been significant change around 
homosexuality in the Church in the same period. 
 
The rejection of homosexuality by New Zealand Christians is so well attested it almost 
seems unnecessary to provide evidence. To give a few examples, a 1972 ―Gay Liberation‖ 
manifesto stated that oppression of homosexuals happened in the family, the school and 
the workplace, ―supported by the church, the media and the law.‖ (Brickell, 2008: 308). 
The manifesto identifies the Church as one of the three main oppressors of gay people. In 
the 1980s Christian groups opposed homosexual law reform, drawing links between AIDS 
and homosexuality. During 1982 to 1984, ―Challenge Weekly‖, a New Zealand Christian 
newspaper, ran numerous articles opposing law reform. The title of Craig Young‘s (2004) 
paper says it all: ―Queers versus the New Zealand Christian Right 1985-1998.‖ However, 
this thesis attempts to show another perspective on this narrative. Even Anthony Venn-
Brown, whose story opens this introduction, has returned to the pentecostal church, wryly 
calling himself ―the first openly gay pentecostal in Australia‖ (Venn-Brown, 2008). 
 
                                               
3Homosexuality could also be considered, for example, an orientation, an identity, or something else. 
Definitions of homosexuality are discussed in chapter two. 
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The main body of this thesis contains seven chapters. The second chapter begins by 
defining terms, followed by a review of relevant literature, mainly around homosexuality, 
religion and Foucault. Chapter three lays the theoretical foundation for this study, 
beginning with an overview of the work of Michel Foucault. In particular this chapter 
considers how Foucault‘s theories might be applied to sociology of religion. The methods 
used to collect and analyse the interview data are discussed in chapter four. Thematic 
analysis is chosen as the approach to analysis. Themes are patterns or regularities 
identified in the transcripts by the researcher. Furthermore, this thesis is a theoretical 
thematic analysis, where the themes are derived primarily from the underlying theories of 
Foucault. In seeking how the discourses of Christianity and homosexuality are enacted and 
embodied by the interviewees I analyse the transcripts under the categories of Belonging 
and Exclusion (chapter five); Belief, Knowledge, Power (chapter six) and The Care of the 
Christian Self (chapter seven). Chapter five presents the value of supportive communities 
for gay Christians, along with the difficulties of their exclusion by religious institutions. 
The use of the term ―belief‖ was identified in the data; chapter six considers religious 
belief as both a form of knowledge and as a practice. This chapter also presents ideas 
around religion and power related to the interview data. In chapter seven techniques of 
Christian selfhood are described, and a key question is asked: Why do gay Christians 
attend church? Three answers are developed from the data: faith, fellowship and identity. 
Research conclusions are summarised in chapter eight.
Chapter 2 
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2 
Definitions and Literature Review 
 
 
“One writes to become someone other than who one is.” 
 (Foucault, 1983d: 404) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Defining Terms 
 
Describing the world of the 21
st
 century religious person is complex and is reflected in the 
challenges of terminology. This research draws on work in the sociology of religion and in 
gay and lesbian studies. Within these fields there are contested terms which came up 
frequently in this research and require clarification. These include religion, Christian, 
church, liberal, conservative, denomination and homosexual. 
 
 
Religion.  
As Linda Woodhead (2011: 121) makes clear, it has proved impossible to fix a definition 
of religion upon which a majority can agree. Recognising this, and after reviewing a 
variety of approaches, I follow Hunt (2005: 13-22) who suggests a minimal ―substantive‖ 
definition of religion: Religion centres on a ―belief in spiritual beings‖. In addition, a 
Foucauldian treatment of religion as apparatus is developed in chapter three. In this study 
I seek to utilise these two definitions of religion without attempting to reconcile them. 
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Christian. 
Sociological definitions of ―Christian‖ vary considerably and have been described as either 
substantive, functional, symbolic, affective, or postmodern (Roberts, 1990; Harrison, 2007; 
Hunt, 2005). In the study I attempt to use Danielle Hervieu-Léger‘s (1998) functional-
affective description of Christian groups. She suggests Christian identity can be mapped 
against four dimensions (fig. 1): 
 
The communal dimension defines the boundary of the group, who is ―in‖ and who is ―out‖. 
It includes formal markers of belonging such as baptism and church attendance. The 
ethical dimension concerns the individual‘s acceptance of the values of the religion. The 
cultural dimension embraces the intellectual and practical elements of the tradition. For 
example, the group‘s doctrines, books, interpretations and ritual practices such as prayer. 
Finally, the emotional dimension concerns the emotional experience of identifying as a 
Christian, including collective feelings. 
 
Alternatively, Foucault (1980a: 169) defines Christianity as a ―confession‖: 
 
―Christianity is a confession. That means that Christianity belongs to a very special 
type of religion, the religions which impose on those who practise them obligations 
of truth.‖ 
 
To locate participants for this study I used the definition: ―People who self-identify as 
Christian and who attend a church at least once per month‖. This became the most useful 
definition. 
Chapter 2 
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Church. 
A church is a religious organisation that has a division of labour between laity and clergy 
(McLennan et al, 2010: 318). Churches are large organisations that claim a ―unique access 
to spiritual truth‖ and they order the ―spiritual, moral, ethical and social life of an entire 
people‖ (Bruce and Yearley, 2006: 260). Churches are typically seen as orthodox and 
respectable whereas sects and cults are viewed as deviant (McLennan et al, 2010: 319). 
Churches are comprised of groups with differing theologies and methods of governance, 
called denominations. 
 
 
Conservative and Liberal (Churches). 
 ―Conservative‖ and ―liberal‖ can refer both to the theological beliefs of churches and to 
their social mores. Conservative churches usually hold to a traditional view of the Bible, 
and tend to have conservative moral and political views. Conservative churches tend to 
promote ―family values‖, where families are defined as married heterosexual parents with 
children. They usually support sexual activity only within heterosexual marriage. 
 
Wellman (2008: 12) uses the term ―evangelical‖ as an umbrella term for conservative 
Christians in American culture. He writes: 
 
―Evangelicals are generally those who emphasize conversion (the need for a 
personal decision to follow Jesus Christ), missionary activity (the obligation to 
share with others this need for conversion), biblicism (seeing the Scriptures as the 
sole authority for belief and action), and crucicentrism (the belief in Christ‘s 
sacrifice on the cross as atonement for human sin).‖ 
 
Wellman further divides this group into ―fundamentalist‖, ―pentecostal-charismatic‖ and 
―neo-evangelical‖ groups. Conversely, ―liberal‖ churches tend to be more open to 
divergence from historic orthodoxy. The term ―liberal‖ usually refers to theologically 
liberal Protestant churches which also tend to be socially liberal, supporting such 
movements as women‘s rights, gay rights, and environmental issues. These churches can 
be more accommodating of sexual activity outside of heterosexual marriage. 
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Wellman (2008: 4) writes: 
 
―Liberal Protestant congregations are defined by a distinct set of ideological 
characteristics. They most often propose that Jesus is a model of radical 
inclusiveness—fashioning an ethic that emphasizes hospitality to those 
marginalized in society—justify themselves in their faith tradition as much by 
reason as by tradition or scripture, and leave decision making about faith or 
personal morality in the responsible hands of the individual. The moral worldview 
of these churches reflects a liberal theology that advocates for the concerns and 
rights of homosexuals; and supports justice causes such as peace, ending 
homelessness, and ecological stewardship. Even as the liberal moral worldview 
tends toward libertarianism in personal morality, it proffers stands on social justice 
and broader support for the ‗common good‘ .‖ 
 
Green (2004) offers a compatible model which subdivides mainline Protestants, 
evangelical Protestants and Catholics into ―traditionalist‖, ―centrist‖, and ―modernist‖ 
ideological categories. Although these writers are working in the context of the USA, the 
New Zealand situation is similar. 
 
As a generalisation, in New Zealand I apply ―conservative‖ to Orthodox denominations, to 
Protestant denominations such as the Open Brethren, Baptist, Ratana, Reformed, Salvation 
Army, Seventh Day Adventist; and Pentecostal churches such as Assemblies of God, 
Apostolic, Destiny and Elim churches. However, individual churches can vary from their 
denomination‘s expected cultural-theological paradigm. The spectrum of individual 
churches within the ―main four‖ Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian and Catholic 
denominations in New Zealand (McLennan et al, 2010: 322) is less clear and can range 
from highly ―liberal‖ to highly ―conservative‖. Hoverd (2008: 50) shows that census 
statistics, for example, are unable to measure evangelical strains within these 
denominations. 
 
However, defining churches as conservative or liberal is problematic; Christian views can 
be deeply nuanced, even in respect to just one issue (Wellman, 2008). There is no 
necessary corollary between being theologically conservative and socially conservative. 
The difficulty of defining the beliefs held by particular denominations, churches or 
Chapter 2 
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individuals is borne out in the responses from participants in this study. Hunt (2009: 21) 
comments: 
 
―To say that there exists a theological polarisation of Christian viewpoints, of 
conservatives versus liberals is, nevertheless, a gross simplification and distortion 
of the positions taken by the churches on a range of gay issues. The reality is that 
Christian stances are now extremely complex and divergent given the explosive 
mixture of biblical hermeneutics, ‗scientific‘ evidence and the extension of human 
rights issues‖. 
 
With this understanding I use the terms ―conservative‖ and ―liberal‖ as a necessary 
convenience; the wide range of views within such churches need to be kept in mind. 
 
 
Homosexual, Gay, LGBT.  
―Lengthy notes on terminology are de rigueur in any study of LGBT people‖, writes 
Wilcox (2003: 183). My task is somewhat simplified in that I am only studying 
homosexual men, however there is much theoretical and community discussion of 
terminology 
4
. It has been argued that across cultures and across time, and even within 
local cultures such as a city there are multiple kinds of ―homosexualities‖. The argument is 
that no single type of homosexual with a unique set of characteristics exists (Murray, 2000: 
1). In this view the gay Christian man could be seen as one among many types. 
 
Recent debate has culminated in homosexuality being defined as ―sexual attraction, sexual 
behavior, political self-identification or some combination of these factors‖ (Parke, 2007). 
Following this definition of sexuality as sexual attraction, sexual behaviour and political 
self-identification, for the purposes of this study I define ―homosexual‖ as 1) a man who is 
romantically attracted to men; and 2) desires sexual contact with men; and 3) defines 
themselves in their discourse as gay. The first point is intended to exclude ―men who have 
sex with men‖ but who may otherwise prefer sex with women. Point two is intended to 
eliminate men who may merely derive deep friendship and love from other men, but would 
                                               
4
 For example, the term (homo) sexuality. Jobson (1999: 8) separates the prefix (homo) to disrupt a 
universalised discourse of sexuality and point out the endemic homo/hetero divide within sexuality 
discourse. 
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not identify as homosexual in their sexual desires.
5
 The third element is derived from 
Foucault; it is concerned with discourse– ―what may be said‖– about oneself. If a man 
does not speak about himself as gay, he may simply be a man who ―has sex with other 
men‖.6 
 
For Foucault, homosexuality is an ―ascesis‖, a ―practice of the self‖ (Piontek, 2006:41). 
Piontek interprets ascesis as ―working on the self to transform it into a source of 
independence and pleasure‖. ―Foucault came to understand both philosophy and 
homosexuality as modern versions of ascesis.‖ (Piontek, 2006:41). 
 
In an interview with a French gay magazine Foucault (1981: 308) denounced: 
 
―the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to the problem of ‗Who am 
I?‘ and ‗What is the secret of my desire?‘ Perhaps it would be better to ask oneself 
‗What relations, through homosexuality, can be established, invented, multiplied 
and modulated?‘ The problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of sex but 
rather to use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships. 
 
Piontek (2006:42) comments, ―Gays, according to Foucault, had to do more than assert an 
identity; they had to create it, and its creation was by no means equivalent to the liberation 
of an essence.‖ Foucault, in the interview above says: ―We have to work at becoming 
homosexual.‖ Foucault rejects the reduction of homosexuality to sexual acts, although he 
does not pit sexuality against relationality but sees them working together (Piontek, 
2006:42).We reduce gay men‘s condition to unintelligibility if we ―explain‖ it by appeal to 
some natural and ahistorical gay essence. 
 
In this study I use the terms ―gay‖ and ―homosexual‖ interchangeably. Occasionally the 
colloquial term ―LGBT‖ (Lesbian-Gay-Bisexual-Transgender) is used and is intended to 
be inclusive of the wider queer community. Having defined terms I turn to a review of 
relevant literature. 
 
                                               
5 ―Sexual orientation, rather than being about self-conscious identity or actual sexual practice, has to do with 
erotic desires and dispositions‖ (Stein, 1992: 5). 
6 In fact, none of the participants used the term ―homosexual‖ of themselves. All preferred to call themselves 
―gay‖.  The term ―homosexual‖ came up rarely in the interviews. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
On a shelf in the basement of the Victoria University library is a book titled ―The Agenda: 
The Homosexual Plan to Change America‖. Nearby on the same shelf is another title: ―The 
Anti-Gay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and the Christian Right.‖ The denouncements of an 
―agenda‖ from two irreconcilably opposed viewpoints ironically illustrate the situation gay 
people find themselves in. 
 
In this section I draw out themes and major points in the body of literature I am working 
with. I show firstly that there are few studies of  ―out gay men‖ who attend conservative or 
evangelical churches. I show secondly that there are few studies of Christianity that make 
use of Foucault. Hence I hope that this combination of topic (―gay Christians‖) and 
methods/theory (Foucault) may help fill a gap in current research. 
 
The literature can be divided into three categories: 
 
1. Homosexuality 
- Lesbian and Gay Studies 
- New Zealand Gay History 
- Homosexuality and Christianity 
2. Religion 
3. Foucault. 
 
 
Lesbian and Gay Studies. 
The literature on homosexuality is now vast. As this study is primarily oriented towards 
Christian religion I have not made lesbian and gay studies or queer theory a major focus 
7
. 
In addition to the works referenced earlier in the definition of homosexuality, I found the 
essays in Lesbian and Gay Studies: A Critical Introduction (Medhurst and Munt, 1997) a 
useful orientation. Many theorists and gay men defend homosexuality as inborn, believing 
there is an ―essential‖ homosexual nature. However, contemporary theorists and queer 
                                               
7
 Piontek (2006: 1) believes there is a degree of conflict between gay and lesbian studies and queer theory. 
Piontek treats gay and lesbian studies and queer theory as distinct approaches. 
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activists ―more and more reject such notions of fixed sexuality and instead argue that 
sexuality can be construed and expressed in many fluid ways‖ (Ganzevoort et al, 2011: 
219). 
 
New Zealand Gay History. 
This study is located culturally and historically within New Zealand. In 2008 Chris 
Brickell published Mates and Lovers, which swiftly became the standard work in New 
Zealand gay history. Brickell writes that sex between Maori men was not unknown during 
the pre-colonial period, and that the record of colonial homoeroticism begins with the 
missionary William Yates who arrived in New Zealand in 1828. Considerable social 
struggle occurred but one hundred and forty years later, by the early 1990‘s, ―the gay New 
Zealander had finally arrived‖ (Brickell, 2008: 27, 344).  
 
The first man to die of AIDS in New Zealand died in New Plymouth in 1983; only three 
years later in 1986 Homosexual Law Reform Bill was passed. Because of HIV/AIDS gay 
and bisexual New Zealanders have had to come to terms with death (Worth, 2003: 12) and 
their sexual practices have changed. Bouldrey (1995: ix) speaks of watching his partner 
Jeff die which ―led to thoughts of my own mortality and, inevitably my own [Catholic] 
spirituality.‖ Picano (1995) titles his spiritual memoir ―AIDS: The New Crucible of Faith‖. 
As with overseas studies, New Zealand studies show that churches in general have not 
been supportive of homosexuality. Guy (2002: 228) surveys the watershed legal and social 
debate over homosexuality between 1960 and 1986, when the conservative Christian 
sexual world was ―routed‖ in the arena of public discourse. He concludes that a paradigm 
change has occurred in New Zealand over this issue where LGBT identities are now much 
more acceptable in the social mainstream. 
 
Growing Up Gay. New Zealand Men Tell Their Stories (Allan, 1996) adds extra context to 
the interviews conducted for this research. The book contains biographies of twelve New 
Zealand men, born from 1950 onwards. Although it is not a primary focus, some of them 
mention their experiences of Christianity, particularly growing up in church-going 
families. Works such as these illustrate the current apparatus and discourses of both 
Christian and non-Christian homosexuals in New Zealand. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
20 
Homosexuality and Christianity. 
In the late 1990s Melissa Wilcox (2003: 10) found that LGBT studies in religion had been 
little explored. Although the field has expanded, it appears there are still relatively few 
studies of religion and homosexuality. In the introduction to Contemporary Christianity 
and LGBT Sexualities Hunt (2009) presents an overview of the current situation in 
Christian Churches. While Hunt‘s chapter is largely focused on the UK, the situation in 
New Zealand is likely to reflect similar views. He cites Coleman (1984) who summarises 
four methodological perspectives that can categorise different Christian approaches: 
 
1. rejecting-punitive 
2. rejecting non-punitive 
3. qualified acceptance 
4. full acceptance. 
 
Two collections treat homosexuality and religion: Que(e)rying Religion: A Critical 
Anthology (Comstock & Henking, 1997) and Gay Religion (Thumma & Grey, 2005). 
Andrew Yip has published extensively on gay Christians, notably his study of sixty-eight 
UK couples in Gay Male Christian Couples (1997). Yip analyses their experience of 
sexuality and spirituality under several categories including ―the power of personal 
experience‖. What is meant by this phrase is that the positive experience of their lives and 
partnerships helped many of the respondents justify the acceptability of their sexuality 
(Yip, 1997: 108). Yip (2003) draws upon research data and various sociological 
commentators to assert that ―the self‖ is the basis of religious faith for non heterosexual 
Christians, playing a far greater role than Church authority. Brian Bouldrey‘s (1995) 
Wrestling with the Angel is a collection of personal stories of gay men and their religious 
lives. The book includes chapters by men who identify as Catholic, Baptist, Lutheran and 
Mormon, along with men from non-Christian religions. 
 
Some studies of gay men focus on their experience of rejection from churches. Usually the 
people interviewed in these studies no longer attend a conservative church. Frequently gay 
people attend conservative churches but remain ―closeted‖, examples can be found in Yip‘s 
work and others above. Wendy Cadge (2005) studies gay friendly ―reconciling churches‖ 
and characterises them as bridging gay and straight communities. Wilcox (2003) studies 
the Metropolitan Community Church, a gay denomination in the USA which has branches 
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worldwide, including in New Zealand. 
 
A nuanced and compassionate hermeneutic by an evangelical gay man can be found in 
Strangers and Friends (Vasey, 1995). Intended for evangelicals, this book describes many 
of the issues theologically conservative gays face in the Church and attempts to reconcile 
being both gay and evangelical. Bulletproof Faith (Chellew-Hodge, 2008), while not 
specifically evangelical, is similar in that it aims to help homosexuals work out their 
Christian faith without rejecting their sexuality. 
 
It is not my intention to evaluate the theological rights and wrongs of homosexuality in 
this study. However, Hunt comments: 
 
―Despite sophisticated hermeneutics and apologetics, and irrespective of the fact 
that the liberal Christians may have current civil rights legislation supporting their 
views of homosexuality, the reality is that they do not have the weight of Church 
history on their side. The early Christian Church, and traditionally the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Churches and later the Protestant churches, 
have been explicitly condemnatory of same-sex sexual relations. Whatever 
revisionist historical accounts claim
8
, the early Church was hostile‖ (Hunt, 2009: 
7). 
 
Thus gay Christians find themselves in the position of opposing the shared moral and 
cultural norms of their Christian peers. Contrary to the impression one might have 
following Hunt‘s description above, Aune (2009: 40) reports: 
 
―In the little academic research and in public understandings there is scant 
recognition that even within evangelicalism, there are affirming theologians, 
evangelical churches that give full membership rights to those in gay relationships 
and several pro-gay organisations.‖ 
 
She reminds us that ―ordinary evangelicals‖– those in ―the church pews, in the plastic 
chairs in school halls or the sofas of evangelical living rooms‖– do not always simply 
                                               
8
For example, Boswell (1980, 1985) and Davies (2006). 
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accept the official views of their churches and denominations. Her own study of a UK 
evangelical congregation revealed such divergence (Aune, 2009). Lending support to this 
idea, a recent US poll shows the majority of ―people of faith‖ believe that that the law 
should treat LGBT people equally, and believe condemnation of homosexuals by religious 
leaders does more harm than good (Human Rights Campaign, 2011). 
 
In an older New Zealand study, interviews carried out in 1978 found that ―most attitudes 
expressed tended to be tolerant, if not accepting, of homosexuals and homosexuality‖ 
(Bowman, 1983: 109). This was at variance with public attitudinal studies carried out in 
the United States around this time. In New Zealand, those that held ―homosexphobia‖9 
views were three times more likely to ―claim a current religion‖, and all of those belonging 
to ―minority fundamentalist Christian sects (ie Mormons, Pentecostal, Assembly of God, 
Christian Science and Reform)‖ were explicitly homophobic. The 2004 New Zealand 
―Lavender Islands‖ study, used later in this thesis, yielded important data about gay 
religion and spirituality (Henrickson, 2007). 
 
Also in the New Zealand context Allison Kirkman‘s 1996 doctoral thesis Ways of being 
religious: Lesbians and Christianity is helpful. Kirkman‘s study of thirty women draws 
upon feminist, interactionist and social constructionist approaches and analyses how 
women who identify as lesbian reconcile their Christian beliefs and their sexual identities. 
There are potential methodological issues in comparing lesbian women and gay men. 
Michael Vasey comments, ―Many factors, including the different location of lesbian and 
gay people within the culture, make it dangerous to extrapolate from gay to lesbian issues‖ 
(Vasey, 1995: 16). And presumably, this also works the other way. While I agree that the 
lives and challenges of lesbian women and gay men cannot be conflated, I think there are 
issues in common, for example the use of scripture and tradition to justify their exclusion 
from churches. I think the existence of self-help books written for both gay men and 
lesbian women in the Church supports this claim (for example, Chellew-Hodge, 2008). 
 
While most studies consider the rejection of homosexuals by the church, a few consider 
their acceptance. In Yip‘s (1997) study, mentioned on page 20, the majority of his 
respondents either left the church or kept their orientation hidden from fellow Christians. 
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 Bowman uses ―homosexphobia‖ in preference to ―homophobia‖. 
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However, he did find a small minority who were openly gay in their church: 
 
―In spite of the fact that this is a rare minority, some respondents are in the 
fortunate position that their sexuality and partnership do not bring any 
stigmatization in the local church. The positive and accepting church climate is the 
most significant reason why they actively participate in church activity and make 
no secret of their sexuality and partnership‖ (Yip, 1997: 114). 
 
Scott Thumma‘s Negotiating a religious identity: The case of the gay evangelical (1991) is 
the only research I have discovered specifically on openly gay men who remain in the 
evangelical church. This US-based study takes an identity-based approach and concludes 
that neither gay nor evangelical identity is compromised in the group of men he studied, 
―rather both are combined to create the new core identity and self-concept of a gay 
Evangelical Christian‖ (Thumma, 1991: 195). 
 
Questions of overlapping identity are described in Ganzevoort et al (2011) Growing up gay 
and religious. Their paper begins with a useful overview of gay-Christian conflict, 
describing it as one of the central conflicts in Christianity within recent decades. It goes on 
to describe four discourses employed in conservative protestant and evangelical circles: 
holiness, subjectivity, obedience and responsibility. Based on interviews with young Dutch 
gay Protestants, the paper characterises four modes of negotiation by gay Christians. 
Briefly, these four modes can be described as ―Christian lifestyle‖, where gay identity is 
rejected; ―gay lifestyle‖, where Christianity is rejected; ―compartmentalising‖, where faith 
and sexuality are kept apart; and ―integration‖, where faith and sexuality are brought 
together. 
 
Dawn Moon‘s (2005) paper Discourse, interaction and testimony is the only other work I 
am aware of that combines the study of religion and homosexuality with Foucault‘s 
theories. She studies micro-level interactions in both anti-gay and pro-gay Christian 
groups, discovering Foucauldian notions of performative power in both. I hope the current 
research will help fill the gap in other studies. 
Religion. 
This research is centred in the sociology of religion. There are many competing ways in 
which religion can be studied; Linda Woodhead (2011) summarises a number of these 
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ways, from ―religion as culture‖ through to ―religion as identity‖ to religion as 
―compensator‖ and religious ―capital‖10. She does not favour a particular approach, 
concluding instead: 
 
―It is more fruitful for scholars of religion to become critically aware of the scope, 
variety and contingency of the term [religion] and its uses– and so better able to 
justify and critique their own conceptual choices‖ (Woodhead, 2011: 138). 
 
In this thesis I have chosen to use the ideas of Michel Foucault to form a basis for analysis. 
This choice derives from my own interest in Foucault and because his work is largely 
under-utilised in studies of religion. James Spickard, for example, writes that ―discourse‖ 
has become fashionable in the social sciences ―with the striking exception of the sociology 
of religion‖ (Spickard, 2006: 170, emphasis mine). ―The famous ‗linguistic turn‘ seems to 
have sidestepped our field,‖ Spickard writes. He notes that although there are occasional 
theoretical pieces, ―none has yet applied the ideas developed by various discourse analysts 
to sociological discourse about religion‖ (Spickard, 2006: 170). While Spickard does not 
reference Carrette‘s and Bernauer‘s seminal studies of Foucault and religion (1999, 2000, 
2004), he is largely correct. Others have noted sociology of religion‘s recent lack of 
engagement with major debates (Fish, 2005: 7). Religion ―has been banished to the 
sidelines in the contemporary field of theoretical struggle‖ (Craig Calhoun, cited in 
Beckford, 2003:12),
11
 although ―post-secularism‖ may place religion at the centre of 
sociological inquiry again (Molendijk et al, 2010). 
 
Foucault has only been mentioned very recently in the sociological study of religion. For 
example, Lilian Voyé‘s (2004) Survey of Advances in the Sociology of Religion (1980– 
2000) mentions globalization, rational choice theory and debates over the concept of 
―religion‖ itself, but no mention is made of Foucault. The relatively few publications on 
Foucault and religion are mainly in the fields of theology, and of religious studies (Carrette 
1999, 2000; Bernauer and Carrette 2004; Tran, 2010). There is a small amount of 
                                               
10
 Drawing on Foucault, King (1999: 211) portrays the field of religious studies as a power construct derived 
from Western Christianity: ―The central normative concepts of the discipline of ‗religious studies‘– terms 
such as ‗religion‘ and ‗mysticism‘, as well as constructs such as ‗Hinduism‘ and ‗Buddhism‘– have a 
discursive history that is bound up with the power struggles and theological issues of Western Christianity.‖ 
11
 Beckford (2003:12) presents additional evidence of the recent lack of theoretical traction in the sociology 
of religion. 
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anthropological literature connecting Foucault and religion. Talal Asad (1993), for 
example, makes use of Foucault in discussing religion and torture. However there is little 
else of Foucault in Asad‘s work. 
 
There is a lack of work on Foucault and religion that is specifically sociological– granting 
that these days the distinction between anthropology and sociology is thin (Wieviorka, 
2010: 21). Brian Turner‘s work usefully connects Foucault and religion (e.g., Turner, 2008) 
and Voyce (2009) has written an innovative Foucauldian study of Buddhist bodily 
practices
12
. Where Foucault is mentioned in relation to religion it is often at a theoretical 
rather than applied level, for example Furseth (2009). Hence, I argue there is more scope 
for applying Foucault to the sociology of religion. 
 
 
Foucault.  
―It is hard to imagine writing about sexuality without the work of Foucault‖, writes Elsbeth 
Probyn (1997:134). Michel Foucault is the major theorist for this study and here I 
highlight books and articles that I have found helpful. 
 
Foucault‘s writing from Discipline and Punish (1975) onwards is especially useful as it is 
in this period that the concepts of power/knowledge and (later) a focus on the self-
constitution of the subject come strongly into view. In The Will to Knowledge: The History 
of Sexuality, Volume One (1976) the power/knowledge dyad is developed further, along 
with new terms such as ―biopower‖, which Morton and Bygrave (2008: 1) describe as the 
power which targets whole populations as opposed to the individual focus of disciplinary 
power. Volumes two and three of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1984a; 1984b) 
introduce his focus on techniques of the self and subjectivity. The essay ―About the 
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self‖ (1980a) is important as it is likely to have been 
included in the unpublished fourth volume of the History of Sexuality (Carrette, 1999: vi; 
Macey, 1993: 466), and is specifically focused on religion. An excerpt of material likely to 
have contributed to this fourth volume is collected in Religion and Culture (Carette, 1999). 
David Macey‘s The Lives of Michel Foucault (1993) is extremely helpful in placing 
Foucault‘s work in context. It is arguably the best intellectual biography of Foucault and 
                                               
12Although sociological in tone, Voyce‘s work is based in legal studies. 
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offers explanations of key concepts like the dispositif (usually translated ―apparatus‖). 
Where Foucault‘s books are difficult his interviews often shed light; Lotringer‘s (1989) 
collection is essential. 
 
Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace‘s (1993) A Foucault Primer. Discourse, Power and the 
Subject, is a good introduction to Foucault. This work confirms Foucault is more ―subject-
friendly‖ than he is sometimes given credit for. McHoul and Grace (1993: 91) write, 
―Foucault never argued on behalf of the radical structuralist idea that there are no subjects, 
that the subject can be ‗deleted‘ … even though his remarks in the final pages of The Order 
of Things on the disappearance of ‗man‘ are sometimes read in this unfortunate way.‖ 
Madan Sarap‘s (1996) Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World is a particularly clear 
overview of key Foucauldian themes, especially in relation to ―techniques of the self‖. 
Finally, David Howarth‘s (2000) Discourse places Foucault in the wider context of other 
discourse theories. The Reality of Social Construction (Elder-Vass, 2012) is helpful with 
social-philosophical aspects of Foucault. Elder-Vass argues that realism, free autonomous 
subjects, and Foucault can comfortably co-exist. A number of other works on Foucault 
were consulted and are referenced in the upcoming chapters. 
 
 
This chapter has defined important terms and reviewed the literature relevant to the study. I 
have presented evidence that there is little extant research which applies a Foucauldian 
approach to the study of gay Christians. In the next chapter I discuss the theoretical 
background to the research. 
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3 
Theory– Foucault and Religion 
 
 
 “I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box... I write for users, not readers.” 
– Foucault, ―Prisons‖ (quoted in Nealon, 2008: 111) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses major theoretical concepts derived from the work of Michel 
Foucault. As indicated by the above quotation, in this study I attempt to use these concepts 
as tools to excavate themes from the interview data. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction– A Non-Historical Historian13 
 
Nearly thirty years after the publication of his last book, Foucault‘s ideas have become 
broadly disseminated in the academic community. To lay the groundwork for Foucauldian 
ideas around religion I begin with an overview of Foucault‘s ―tools‖. There is debate about 
whether Foucault changed his approach over time. For example, towards the end of his life 
Foucault writes, 
 
―I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last 
twenty years. It has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate 
the foundations of such an analysis…‖  He concludes, ―Thus it is not power, but the 
subject which is the general theme of my research. It is true that I became quite 
                                               
13 Clifford Geertz, reviewing Discipline and Punish, calls Foucault ―a kind of impossible object: a 
nonhistorical historian, an anti-humanistic human scientist, and a counter-structuralist structuralist‖ (Macey, 
1993: 432). 
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involved with the question of power.‖ 
(Foucault, 1982a: 208, 209) 
 
However, Foucault‘s claim that his entire oeuvre is centred on the subject may only be a 
reflection of his interests at the time. As McHoul (1997: 778) comments, ―At almost any 
stage of his writing, there is an interviewed or a lecturing Foucault who summarises his 
work to date in terms of his current preoccupations‖. To be fair, Foucault admits he 
sometimes changes his mind and that his is a work in progress (AK: 18-19, HS2: 11). 
 
Foucault declares his work had three ―theoretical shifts‖ (HS2: 6) and his work is 
customarily divided into three distinct phases, the 1960s ―archaeological period‖, 1970s 
―genealogical period‖ and 1980s ―ethical period‖ (Oksala, 2007: 3). These periods do not 
suggest an abandonment of earlier work, but a ―shift in emphasis‖ (Miller, 2008: 252). 
 
In recent years the influence of Heidegger has been cause for controversy, based on 
Foucault‘s final interview where he claims for the first time that Heidegger was his 
―essential philosopher‖, not Nietzsche: ―My entire philosophical development was 
determined by my reading of Heidegger‖ (Foucault, 1984f: 470). Rather than identifying 
particular Heideggerian concepts in Foucault, Rayner (2007: 6) proposes Foucault adopted 
Heidegger‘s method. Following Heidegger, Foucault was engaged in philosophy as a 
practice of self-transformation– a concept that seems to fit with his later ―care of the self‖. 
 
 
Episteme, Apparatus, Archaeology, Genealogy. 
It is worth looking briefly at how Foucault located his work in order to locate the current 
study. In his early period Foucault locates his studies within épistémès, for example 
―madness‖, ―medicine‖, and ―science‖. However, by the time of The History of Sexuality: 
An Introduction Foucault changed his organising principle from épistémè to dispositif, 
usually translated as ―apparatus‖. Foucault acknowledges in a 1977 interview that he has 
moved away from the episteme, admitting that ―his attempt to write a history of the 
épistémè in The Order of Things had … led him into a blind alley. The épistémè was no 
more than a specifically discursive dispositif ‖ (Macey, 1993: 355). A dispositif is a 
network that binds together a mixed body of discourses, propositions, institutions, 
architectural forms, laws and scientific statements in relations of power (Agamben, 2006: 
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2,3; Macey, 1993: 355). Foucauldian research attempts to describe the elements of the 
dispositif under investigation. In this thesis, I use the notion of dispositif to refer to the 
Christian religion. 
 
Foucault‘s histories are intended to yield a ―history of the present‖. To study these histories 
Foucault used the method of archaeology, which he later developed into genealogy. 
Howarth (2000: 67) even suggests that archaeology and genealogy are articulated together 
as the ―method of problematization‖ (see HS2: 11-13). Rather than a focus only on 
language, genealogy is also concerned with investigating power and practices (Gutting, 
2005: 45). Foucault‘s 1971 essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, History is often taken as a 
description of Foucault‘s methods 14. Bryan Turner (2008: 136) summarises Nietzsche‘s 
concept of genealogy as a series of accidental ruptures. Thus, in the current study, 
Foucault‘s genealogy leads us to postulate the ―rupture‖ of gay Christianity, a new 
discourse in the history of the Christian religion. In other words, rather than a slow 
evolution it requires a historical ―break‖ or ―rupture‖ for Christians to change their 
approach to Christian homosexuals. 
 
 
Discourse. 
The study of discourse is foundational to Foucault‘s method. Simply put, Foucauldian 
discourses are the limits and forms of what is, at any given time, sayable (Probyn, 1997: 
138). Foucault‘s concept of discourse is fully discussed in chapter four. However, here I 
mention two ‗meta-theoretical‘ points which affect the current study. 
 
First, it is important to be conceptually clear about the term ―discourse‖. David Howarth 
(2000: 2) writes that ―for some, discourse analysis is a very narrow enterprise that 
concentrates on a single utterance, or at most a conversation between two people. Others 
see discourse as synonymous with the entire social system, in which discourses literally 
constitute the social and political world.‖ Foucault fits best in the latter category. The term 
―discourse‖ is used in at least six distinct theoretical approaches, some of which have little 
in common. Linguistics, critical discourse analysis, Foucault, post-Marxism, discursive 
psychology and interpretive repertoires all use the term ―discourse‖. The differences in 
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 Gutting (2005: 44) disagrees, saying Foucault never claims Nietzsche‘s methods for his own. This 
argument need not concern us here. 
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each theory will be not be discussed here; the point I am making is that my use of the term 
―discourse‖ in the current study is specifically Foucauldian. 
 
Second, there is the question of how gay and Christian discourses operate on the men in 
this study, which relates to the question of causality. Foucault himself was not interested in 
the causality of discourses, suggesting only that discourses interact with other discourses 
and non-discursive forms. Dreyfus and Rabinow believe Foucault need not explain how 
discourses cause people to act, ―he need only describe the changing discursive practices‖ 
(cited in Elder-Vass, 2012: 153). Elder-Vass (2012: 154) shows it is reasonable to speak of 
the causality of discourses, suggesting the influence of discourses can be traced to groups 
of people with the collective commitment to enforce them. He believes it is possible to 
hold this view while avoiding the primacy of either the thoughts of individuals or the 
power of institutions (structuralism), both of which Foucault disavowed. Space precludes a 
fuller discussion. 
 
 
Power/Knowledge, Resistance. 
Looking for evidence of power and knowledge is a key method for Foucault, which can be 
applied to religion. Foucault offers an apparently simple definition: 
 
―[Power] is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society‖ (HS1: 92). 
 
He elaborates, 
 
―the network of power relations [forms] a dense web that passes through 
apparatuses [dispositifs] and institutions, without being actually localized in them‖ 
(HS1: 92). 
 
Power relations
15
 always operate in tandem with knowledge for Foucault. Wherever one is, 
the other exists, summed up in the term ―power/knowledge‖ (DP: 27, 28). The solidus 
suggests power and knowledge are not to be studied separately. Power should not be 
                                               
15 ―I scarcely use the word ‗power‘, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as shorthand for the expression I 
generally use: ‗relations of power‘ ‖ (Foucault, 1984e: 441). 
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understood as simple hierarchies, patriarchies or domination: 
 
―I would like to disconnect the notion of power from the notion of domination. 
Domination is only one form of power-relation. I should also note that power has to 
be de-connected from the notion of repression. There are a lot of power-relations 
which have repression-effects, but there are also a lot of power-relations which 
have something else entirely as their consequence‖ (Foucault: 1984a: 418). 
 
Thus, it is important to understand that power is not necessarily ‗negative‘ for Foucault; 
power can be productive. Domination can be characterised as power-over and production 
as power-to. Even the oppressed can have power, illustrated by the concept of ―resistance‖. 
―Foucault has argued that within relations of power, individuals and groups can find space 
to resist domination, exercise freedom, and pursue their interests‖ (Tamboukou, 1999: 
203), which is described as ―resistance‖ (HS1: 95). Resistance is always present where 
there is power (DP: 27, 28). Foucault writes that the ―swarm‖ of points of resistance 
traverse social stratifications and individual persons (HS1: 92). 
 
I conceive of resistance as another kind of power which carries its own knowledge. To use 
a physical analogy, power can be conceived as something like a network of electrical 
forces, electrons orbiting an atom, or gravitational forces. As two gravitational bodies 
always act on each other, power and resistance cannot help attracting each other. 
 
Power relations are manifest in ―disciplinary power‖ on bodies. However discipline is 
more than just coercion of bodies. In a factory, for example, a job allotted to a worker also 
characterises and defines her or him. Discipline ―makes‖ people and ―normalises‖ them 
(Sarup, 1996: 72). 
 
 
Techniques of the Self, The Subject. 
I have already quoted Foucault‘s statement, ―it is not power, but the subject which is the 
general theme of my research‖ (1982a: 209). Indeed, ―it was [Foucault‘s] concern with the 
self, and with the problematics swirling around it, that provided the major themes for his 
thought from 1976 to 1984‖ (Piontek, 2006: 105). Foucault‘s interest in the subject– the 
human being, ―man‖–  can in turn be applied to the religious subjects in this study. In a 
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passage in The Order of Things (OT: 420), Foucault regularly invokes God or ―the gods‖ 
in discussing the ―death of man‖, for example: 
 
―… it is in the death of God that [man] speaks, thinks, and exists, his murder itself is 
doomed to die; new gods, the same gods are already swelling the future Ocean; 
man will disappear.‖ 
 
At the close of The Archaeology of Knowledge (AK: 232) Foucault writes: 
 
―… you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but don‘t 
imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer 
than he.‖ 
 
These are very Nietzschean statements. Thus it is unsurprising; the predominant American 
reading and primary source for many interpretations is a Nietzschean Foucault (Picket, 
2005: 3). Incidentally, Foucault empathised with those who found his ―death of man‖ 
thesis uncomfortable, writing ―I understand the unease of all such people‖ and ―one cannot 
but sympathise‖ (AK: 232). 
 
In spite of the mentions of deity above, Foucault is not really concerned with religion. He 
is summarising his view that the concept of ―man‖ is a modern invention, a view that he 
elucidates in the final two chapters of the Order of Things. The imminence of the death of 
man is ―the single idea for which Foucault‘s philosophy is best known‖ according to 
Bernauer (2004: 87). Many see Foucault taking pleasure in the nihilistic destruction of 
―man‖, but such an interpretation is ―an extraordinary misperception of the temper and 
meaning of Foucault‘s announcement‖ (Bernauer, 2004: 87). Foucault refers to the 
destruction of the humanistic concept of Enlightenment ―man‖, not of human beings 
themselves (see Due, 2007: 15-17). For comparison, Heidegger also criticised humanism, 
which in post-WWII post-existentialism was viewed as anthropocentric and holding 
dubious political associations (Han-Pile, 2010: 118). Foucault‘s interest in Heidegger 
might explain his dismissal of humanism. So the ―man‖ of Enlightenment humanism is 
dead for Foucault, but he retains a live interest in human beings as subjects. 
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For example, Foucault speaks forcefully about the subject in two late interviews: 
 
―I don‘t think there is actually a sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of 
subject that one could find everywhere. I am very sceptical and very hostile toward 
this conception of the subject. I think on the contrary that the subject is constituted 
through practices of subjection, or, … through practices of liberation, of freedom… 
starting of course from a number of rules, styles and conventions that are found in 
the culture‖ (Foucault, 1984g: 452). 
 
Foucault appears to think the subject is not a unity: 
 
―[The subject] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or 
always identical to itself. You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself 
when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a 
meeting and when you are seeking to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. 
Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms 
of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case, 
one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship to oneself. And it is 
precisely the historical continuation of these various forms of the subject in relation 
to the games of truth that interests me‖ (Foucault, 1984e: 440). 
 
In the above passage truth games (discourses) and practices constitute us as persons and it 
even appears we have multiple ―selves‖, however this is conceived. Because discourses 
construct us Foucault is often characterised as requiring that we are not free, that the 
subject can have no autonomy or agency. However, as Miller (2008) and others show, 
Foucault can be interpreted in a way that allows some degree of freedom for subjects to 
choose. Elder-Vass (2012: 188-189) contends that Foucault had two views of the subject. 
These can be summarised as an (early) strong, subjected, non-agential subject and a (later) 
weak, resisting, agential subject. An interpretation of Foucault‘s subjects as free agents is 
supported by many including Han-Pile (2010), Sarup (1996), and McHoul and Grace 
(1993). Foucault himself says in a late interview that ―the mad subject is not an unfree 
subject‖, and that ―power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free‖ 
(Foucault, 1984e: 440, 441). 
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Foucault takes up an explicit concern with the self in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of 
the Self, the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality. Here he considers the 
question of ethics, by which he means the way in which we relate to our self. The 
relationship to oneself has four major aspects which I summarise briefly: ethical substance, 
mode of subjection, self-forming activity, and telos. The ethical substance is the part of us 
which is considered the appropriate domain in which to apply ethics. For example, are 
ethics to be applied to feelings, to intentions, to desires, or to other aspects of our 
behaviour? The mode of subjection is the way in which we recognise our obligations. For 
example, these obligations may be imposed by divine law, by reason, by political 
convention and otherwise. Self-forming acts are the means by which we change ourselves, 
our practices. Telos is the ultimate end or purpose to which these ethical techniques aim 
(HS2: 26-28). 
 
Techniques of the self are the practices by which we apply these ethics to ourselves; the 
techniques are self-forming activity and the central mechanism of Foucault‘s late period. 
Foucault is widely regarded as favouring a reinvention of the self as an aesthetic 
experience, of making one‘s life a ―work of art‖. Foucault‘s ethics of the self can be seen 
as a way to escape the disciplinary power described in Discipline and Punish. ―He 
argued‖, writes Sarup (1996: 88), ―that an ethics of the self was the only way in which an 
individual could resist the normalising effects of disciplinary power.‖ 
 
 
3.2 Foucault and Religion 
 
Following this brief survey, I now consider what Foucault might theorise around religion. 
As noted in chapter two, there is little work on Foucault and religion that is specifically 
sociological. I consider three approaches: First, I ask if Foucault provides a general theory 
of religion– as we shall see, there is disagreement on this point. Second, I look for 
comments on religion in his writing, for example mentions of churches or spirituality. 
Third, I seek to apply elements of his ‗non-religious‘ theory such as power/knowledge to 
religion. I think the latter two options offer the strongest resources for a Foucauldian 
theory of religion. 
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I will begin with an overview of Foucault‘s comments on religion. Bernauer (2005: 558) 
suggests Foucault‘s interest in religious themes is difficult to overlook given the frequent 
mention of religious practices scattered throughout his writing. Foucault analysed ancient 
Christian texts as part of his later work, particularly in HS2 and HS3, and the earlier 
lectures associated with those books. He also wrote briefly on Islam in relation to the 1979 
Iranian revolution, and on Buddhism following a stay in a Japanese temple (Carrette, 
1999). There are allusions to religion and illustrations using religious concepts scattered 
through his writing. For example, in Discipline and Punish Foucault writes of the ―soul‖: 
 
―It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect‖. ―On 
the contrary‖, he continues, ―it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently 
around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power…‖ (DP: 29). 
 
―Spirituality‖ is also a concept which Foucault uses: 
 
―By spirituality, I understand… that which precisely refers to a subject acceding to a 
certain mode of being and to the transformations which the subject must make of 
himself in order to accede to this mode of being‖ (Foucault, 1984e: 443). 
 
For Foucault, spirituality involves work on the self; it is not something vague and 
immaterial. In a 1980 lecture Foucault speaks of ―souls‖ as part of: 
 
―techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own mean, a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own 
thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner to transform themselves, 
modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of 
purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let‘s call this kind of techniques [sic] a 
techniques or technology of the self‖ (Foucault, 1980a: 162). 
 
Note that Foucault says that through such self transformation one might attain not only a 
state of happy perfection, but also ―supernatural power.‖ A section of Madness and 
Civilisation discusses the influence of religion on the birth of the asylum. By the end of the 
classical period, ―the asylum is a religious domain without religion, a domain of pure 
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morality, of ethical uniformity‖ (MC: 257). 
 
Jeremy Carrette (1999: vi ) presents evidence that Foucault was about to publish more 
extensively on Christianity when he died. Confessions of the Flesh (Les aveux de la chair) 
was almost complete before Foucault‘s death, as he had started writing it before The care 
of the self, and a copy of it is privately held in the Foucault archive. Macey (1993: 466) 
supports the existence of this fourth volume of the History of Sexuality. Carrette (1999) 
contains what is believed to be currently extant from this work. 
 
On religion itself, Foucault writes: 
 
―It is not that religion is delusional by nature, nor that the individual, beyond 
present-day religion, rediscovers his most suspect psychological origins. But 
religious delusion is a function of the secularization of culture: religion may be the 
object of delusional belief insofar as the culture of a group no longer permits the 
assimilation of religious or mystical beliefs in the present context of experience‖ 
(Foucault, 1962: 81). 
 
Here Foucault says religion can only be delusion if the wider culture no longer accepts the 
validity of a religious worldview. Foucault seems to accept secularization theory although 
for the early modern period ―he refused the topography of a religious era yielding to a 
secular age‖ (Bernauer, 2005: 558). 
 
It is possible to draw some conclusions about religion from Foucault‘s study of monastic 
disciplines. Here he speaks of a ―process of subjectification‖ which ―is inseparable from a 
process of understanding which make the obligation to search and to tell the truth 
regarding oneself into a permanent and indispensable condition‖ (Foucault, 1982b: 196). 
Telling the truth about ourselves is how we are made subjects (subjectified), under the 
surveillance of one‘s confessor. Asad (1993: 111-115) believes Foucault leaves out ―one 
crucially important fact‖ in his study of Christian monastics. From other texts Asad shows 
that a monk‘s progress was only possible through social relationships; the technology of 
the self was itself dependent on organized community life. There was thus no single point 
of surveillance– one‘s confessor– against which the self examined itself, but a network of 
mutual observation. The idea that religion can be seen as a type of surveillance is 
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developed by Geroulanos (2006) and is discussed further in chapter six. 
 
 
The Apparatus of Religion. 
It is claimed that Foucault did not publish a general theory of religion. As Carrette (2000: 
5) writes, ―we must constantly bear in mind that Foucault does not provide a distinctive 
and separate discussion of religion or Christianity.‖ While technically true, my reading of 
Foucault inclines more towards James Bernauer‘s approach: 
 
―I would like to claim that Foucault‘s thought does in fact contain a philosophy of 
religion. In as much as his project was a ‗history of the present‘, he is necessarily 
engaged in a religious analysis because the forms of knowledge, power and 
subjectivity which he saw as animating our culture are often constructed in decisive 
ways in argument or alliance with religious practices and concerns‖ (Bernauer, 
2005: 558). 
 
Carrette (2000) attempts to summarise Foucault‘s perspective on religion as ―spiritual 
corporality and political spirituality‖. By spiritual corporality he means ―a critique of the 
silencing powers of religion‖ and a focus on the body. Political spirituality denotes ―a 
critique of religious authority in the demand for confession‖ (Carrette, 2000: 4). Carrette is 
a little unclear what he means by ―spirituality‖ 16. Alternatively he sums up religion as ―an 
immanent political experience which attempts to govern human life‖ (Carrette, 2000: 142). 
This aspect picks up on Foucault‘s view in Madness and Civilisation of religion as a 
―constant principle of coercion‖ (MC: 252). Carrette‘s work is important, particularly 
when considering the later ―ethical‖ Foucault. I think it is also useful to consider how an 
earlier Foucault might have applied concepts such as ―apparatus‖ and ―power/knowledge‖ 
to religion. When employed with care, many of Foucault‘s concepts can be successfully 
applied to religion. Some examples are sketched below, to be fleshed out through 
interaction with the study data. 
 
In Foucauldian terms I think religion may be considered a governing apparatus. In The 
History of Sexuality, for example, the apparatus is ―sexuality‖. In Foucauldian conception, 
                                               
16
 Flannagan (2007:5) advocates a ―sociology of spirituality‖ but acknowledges that spirituality is an 
extremely difficult term to define. 
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we can consider Christianity a historically constructed apparatus: a dispersed system of 
morals, techniques of power, discourses and procedures designed to mould religious 
practices towards certain strategic and political ends. As an institution, a church would be a 
non-discursive form within the apparatus. 
 
Religion and theology tend to associate themselves with a discourse of power according to 
Caputo (2006: 35). Woodhead (2011: 134) notes that in some writers Foucault‘s ideas have 
led to a new sensibility of religion as power. She suggests religion as power has been 
neglected because secularization theories have emphasised the loss of religion‘s social 
power. Woodhead suggests that religion explicitly offers followers a relationship with 
power; religion ―typically offers relationship with some form of higher power or powers‖. 
In addition, religious institutions and elites, themselves empowered by virtue of an 
acknowledged relation to higher powers, also exercise significant this-worldly power over 
their own followers. This leads to the intriguing concept of God as a power-over or power-
to, considered in chapter six. In chapter six I also propose that religious beliefs are a form 
of knowledge, and are therefore part of Foucault‘s knowledge/power circuit17. 
 
I suggest Foucault‘s view of the subject may also be incorporated in a Foucauldian view of 
religion. In HS2 and HS3, as Roach (2005:61) puts it, ―Foucault looks back to a time when 
moral life was not completely governed by Christian confessional imperatives in order to 
envision a future beyond sexuality.‖ Foucault believed Christianity introduced into Greek 
culture the idea of a deep self which must be deciphered and spoken about (Sarup, 1996: 
88). Ancient Christianity was preoccupied with obedience and self-renunciation. Under 
this regime the self was not something to be made, but to be deciphered and renounced. 
 
As an aside, it may be asked whether Foucault‘s ideas have any bearing on metaphysical 
questions. Foucault himself was an atheist (Carrette, 2000: xi) and it would do him an 
injustice to read his work otherwise. He did acknowledge his Catholic background: 
Bernauer (2004: 93) relates an unpublished part of a discussion at Berkeley in the early 
1980s, writing, ―When one of his discussants noted that his comment seemed ‗very 
Christian‘, Foucault replied: ‗Yes, I have a very strong, Christian background, and I am not 
ashamed‘‖ (Bernauer, 2004: 93). 
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 Nola (2003) criticises both Foucault and the ―sociology of knowledge‖, stating they both mistake belief 
for knowledge. 
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However, Foucault‘s analysis is only interested in how religious practices and discourses 
construct people. Foucault‘s method is agnostic, which means that for those to whom it 
matters, discourse theory may still leave room for God. As Spickard (2007:132) writes, 
―calling religion a discourse does not make it any less real‖. 
 
To summarise: Based on Foucault‘s work, I propose that religion is an apparatus– 
comprised of institutions such as churches, and discourses, bound together in relations of 
power/knowledge. Within this apparatus, people are both constructed by religious 
discourses and use techniques of the self to construct for themselves a religious self. 
 
I conclude with two related issues. This study concerns beliefs, or theological discourses, 
raising the need to clarify the relationship of theology to sociology. The recent 
development of postsecularism is also relevant for the interaction of theology and 
sociological theory. 
 
 
3.3 Theology, Sociology of Religion, Postsecularism 
 
What do I mean by ―theology‖? It is important to distinguish between what might be called 
professional theology and popular theology. Professional theology is official, academic, 
systematic, formal, written, held by religious leaders. It uses religious texts such as the 
Bible in prescribed ways. Popular theology is unofficial, colloquial, unsystematic, 
informal, spoken, held by laity. It may use religious texts in different ways to that 
promoted by clergy. Popular theology is what is commonly called ―beliefs‖. My 
impression is that postsecular commentators primarily work with academic theology. 
Professional theology influences the lay public through discourse. This is probably one of 
the roles of preaching in Christian churches. However, I think some at least of the 
sociological analysis of formal written theology can also be applied to informal spoken 
theology. In the case of the men studied here, I am interested in their popular theology, 
their beliefs. The men in this study are employing spoken theology, verbalising their 
beliefs informally. These discourses may be studied in a similar way to more formal 
expressions of faith. 
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Theology has been studied for sociological purposes before, famously in Weber‘s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 2002: 104). Weber took the word 
―charisma‖ from theology (MacRae, 1974: 12). Neither theology nor religious studies can 
be considered sociology. However, theology‘s connection with social science is critically 
evaluated by Harrington (2006) and Flanagan (2001) who conclude that there can be a 
productive relationship between the two. I do not agree with what appears to be Flanagan‘s 
fideism. 
 
Bernauer (2005) uses the subtitle ―Foucault and theological culture‖. By this he means the 
culture of Christian theology itself and its direct influence on pastoral power, confession, 
and so forth. However, I think it can be argued that all of modern Western culture is 
theological culture, because it is formed and underlied by religious understandings. As 
Foucault points out, for example, (Christian) pastoral power became the foundation of 
governmentality, and confession led to the rise of the psychiatrist. Even in a secularised 
modernity, we cannot escape millennia of theological discourse– which is perhaps the 
point of the postsecular turn. 
 
Postsecularism. 
Recently there has been a return of contributions in sociology and philosophy with an 
interest in theology (Harrington, 2006). Harrington lists post-2000 works by Habermas, 
Taylor, Marion, Janicaud, Joas, Theunissen, Graf, Zizek, Badiou, Debray, Bhaskar, 
Assmann, Eisenstadt. I would also add Giorgio Agamben to this list. Therborn (2006: 190) 
in the same volume also detects a ―theological turn‖. ―By now the interest of European 
philosophers in theology has surely made the transition from being a trend to being an 
established fact‖, argues Kotsko (2010: 209). Critchley (2012:8) writes, ―The return to 
religion has become perhaps the dominant cliché of contemporary theory‖.  
 
It seems to me this resurgence of interest in theology is supported by the new theories of 
―post-secularism‖. Although the term has various antecedents, it is usually traced to a 2001 
speech by Jürgen Habermas. Post-secular terminology comes in the wake of other ―posts‖, 
the postcolonial, the post-national and especially the postmodern (Dillion, 2012; Boy, 
2011). It is suggested that the social world in Europe, Australia and New Zealand is now 
post-secular, incorporating secularism but going beyond it. Boy (2011) notes that ―the 
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question of secularization theory and whether it should be abandoned forms an important 
part of this discussion. Only sociologists allowing that classical secularization theory is in 
disarray find the concept of the postsecular to have any value.‖ Hans Joas (2008), for 
example, writes that, ―the concept of the postsecular society, which is now alleged to have 
come into existence, has become no more plausible despite multiple repetitions. There has 
after all been no sudden increase in the number of believers, nor has the state cast off its 
secular self-understanding.‖ 
 
Kotsko (2010: 210) argues that ―European investigators of theology are looking for a way 
out of Christianity.‖ However, I am not sure this is always the case; I think Agamben, for 
example, is trying to find an ‗in between‘ path, rather than outright rejection of religion. I 
see hints of such an in between path in my reading of Foucault, although he is not regarded 
as a postsecular thinker. It may be that a postsecular approach can add to the interpretation 
of Foucault‘s work. 
 
In a postsecular world, must one either defend a version of secularism or quietly slide into 
some form of theism? Critchley (2012: 19) claims to refuse either option, ―neither 
traditional theism nor evangelical atheism will suffice.‖ What is required is a 
―theologically engaged atheism that resembles disappointed belief. Such atheism, only a 
semitone from faith, would be like musical dissonance, the more acute for its proximity‖ 
(Critchley, 2012: 19). This phrase seems to me to summarise post-secularism‘s 
philosophical stance, although Critchley does not use this term. 
 
 
This chapter has considered Foucault‘s theoretical tools and their relation to sociology of 
religion. I suggest that many of Foucault‘s ideas can be applied to religion without doing 
violence to either.
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4 
Methodology 
 
 
“The ideas I would like to discuss here represent neither a theory nor a 
methodology.” 
(Foucault, 1982a: 777) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated above, Foucault sometimes wished to avoid methodological questions. Riis 
(2009: 229) also suggests that sociologists of religion often avoid methodology. In this 
chapter, the methodology for the current study is reviewed; I discuss how this research was 
carried out and the basis underlying it. I use Crotty‘s (1998) schema to link the elements of 
this chapter.
18
 Following this schema we can consider four elements of research that 
inform one another. Crotty (1998: 3) describes these elements as follows: 
 
 ―Methods: the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to 
some research question or hypothesis. 
Methodology: the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice 
and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the 
desired outcome. 
Theoretical Perspective: the philosophical stance informing the methodology and 
thus providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria. 
Epistemology: the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and 
thereby in the methodology.‖ 
 
                                               
18
 Crotty (1998: 2) notes that his ―scaffold‖ is only a tool, it is not the only way to analyse and understand 
the research process. 
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Following this model, my research can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Epistemology: Constructionism. 
 Theoretical Perspective: Foucauldian themes. 
 Methodology: Thematic Analysis. 
 Methods: Semi-structured interviews. 
 
These components are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
4.1 Epistemology 
 
Social constructionism (hereafter, constructionism) has become a foundational 
epistemology for many social science projects since the 1960s (Gubrium and Holstein, 
2008: 4; Crotty, 1998: 3). It is the epistemological basis for the current research. Stein 
(1992: 6) describes the first volume of Foucault‘s The History of Sexuality as the locus 
classicus of social constructionists. As Gubrium and Holstein (2008: 3) explain 
constructionism: 
 
―the world we live in and our place in it are not simply and evidently ‗there‘ for 
participants. Rather, participants actively construct the world of everyday life and 
its constituent elements.‖ 
 
A man is not born homosexual on this view, for example, but either constructs a world for 
himself or has his world constructed for him by social discourses. As discussed previously, 
the early Foucault is less interested in how social actors actively construct their world than 
in how the world is constructed for them by discourses (Miller, 2008: 268). It is the later 
―ethical‖ Foucault who is more amenable to a world constructed by subjects. 
 
Constructionism is interested in the meanings of actions and discourses, and often uses 
qualitative methods, but there are no specifically constructionist methods. Burr (2003: 24-
26) does imply that discourse analysis, discussed below, is a uniquely constructionist 
method. 
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In the sociology of religion the constructionist model has been the dominant paradigm 
since Peter Berger. This means that ―religious reality is socially constructed, and this 
emergent reality acts back upon its producers‖ (Poloma, 1995: 165). Beckford (2003) 
acknowledges the constructivist perspective is only one among many, and although he 
approves of pluralism in theoretical approaches he writes, ―I believe that the benefits of 
social constructionism in the study of religion have not been adequately acknowledged‖ 
(2003: 193). It is probably worth clarifying that by adopting constructionism there is no 
intention to deny a priori the possibility that God or supernatural powers exist (Beckford, 
2003: 28). The questions raised in this research are simply concerned with the uses human 
beings make of religion, what might be called ‗methodological agnosticism‘.  
 
Constructionism is often contrasted with ―essentialism‖, which maintains that people have 
some innate essential characteristics. This has led to another controversy over social 
constructionism which is particularly relevant for the current study. In Hacking's (1995: 
366) description of the debate: 
 
―It was important to one party to maintain that ‗the homosexual‘ as a ‗kind of 
person‘ is a social construct, chiefly of psychiatry and jurisprudence. It was 
important for others to insist that some people in every era have been sexually and 
emotionally attracted chiefly to people of their own sex.‖ 
 
However, this issue may not be as great a problem as it once appeared. Citing Stein (1992), 
Hacking (1995: 366) believes there are ―several ways in which essentialist and 
constructionist attitudes are not only compatible but also mutually supporting.‖ Hence, 
without going into detail, the constructionist perspective of the current study need not 
conflict with ideas of an ―innate‖ homosexuality. 
 
 
Ontology. 
Epistemological and ontological issues tend to arise together (Crotty, 1998:10-12). 
Ontology is the study of being, of what exists. I do not feel it necessary to take an explicit 
ontological position here although I lean towards realism. By realism, Elder-Vass (2012: 6) 
means ―the belief that there are features of the world that are they way they are 
independently of how we think about them.‖ Putting this another way, realism is the belief 
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that realities exist outside the mind. Elder-Vass (2012) argues that social scientists should 
be both realists and social constructionists, that this is the preferred ontological-
epistemological position. Crotty (1998:11) recommends that ontological issues be dealt 
with as they arise, rather than requiring detailed treatment in our methodology. 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical Perspective 
 
It is important that the theoretical position of a research topic that draws on thematic 
analysis is made clear (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 81). The theoretical base for this study is 
largely drawn from the work of Michel Foucault and is discussed in chapter three. 
 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
Thematic analysis. 
This project uses thematic analysis to interrogate the data collected in the interviews. 
Thematic analysis is arguably the most common approach to data analysis in the social 
sciences according to Roulston (2001: 280). Thematic analysis was chosen for this 
research because it can be applied across a range of theoretical approaches and is 
compatible with constructionist paradigms. Thematic analyses may be further divided into 
sub-types; inductive versus theoretical, and manifest versus latent. These sub-types are 
described below, but first it is worth defining what is meant by a ―theme‖. 
 
―A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, 
and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set‖ (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006: 82). Themes can describe both implicit and explicit ideas within the data 
(Guest et al, 2012: 10). A theme is often described as a pattern. Ideally there will be a 
number of instances of the theme across the data set, but there are no hard and fast rules 
about how frequently the pattern occurs. Thus, the researcher‘s judgement is necessary to 
determine what a theme is, and its prevalence. How ‗key‘ a theme is depends on whether it 
captures something important in relation to the overall research question. The researcher 
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always plays an active role in identifying patterns/themes, selecting which are of interest 
and reporting on them. 
 
Themes can be identified in two ways: Either in an ―inductive‖ or ―bottom-up‖ way, or in a 
―theoretical‖, ―deductive‖ or ―top-down‖ way (Boyatzis, 1998). Inductive thematic 
analysis is a process of coding data without trying to fit it to a pre-existing theoretical 
frame, and can be compared with grounded theory. However, Braun and Clarke (2006: 84) 
emphasise that even in inductive analysis, ―researchers cannot free themselves of their 
theoretical and epistemological commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological 
vacuum.‖ In contrast, theoretical thematic analysis is driven by the researcher‘s theoretical 
or analytic interest and is thus explicitly analyst-driven. Theory-driven code development 
is probably the most frequently used approach in social science research according to 
Boyatzis (1998: 33). Theoretical ideas can be indispensable tools in stimulating 
sociological research of religion according to Beckford (2003: 11,12), and the interview 
data in this study was coded using theory-driven analysis. Theoretical thematic analysis 
tends to provide a more detailed analysis of some aspect of the data rather than a rich 
description of the overall data. Thus it is possible to code for a quite specific research 
question. Use of theoretically informed themes for analysis can make the question of the 
researcher‘s reflexivity clear. By ‗reflexivity‘, the researcher‘s influence on that which is 
being researched is meant (Hayes, 1997:112).  
 
Hayes (1997:113) mentions a possible cost to using theoretically-driven themes in that 
―novel material‖, inappropriate to the theoretical themes will not be included in the 
analysis. In this study I tried to counter this risk by being open to ‗discovering‘ and 
including new themes arising from the transcript data. The theme of belief as knowledge 
was initially developed in this way. In addition, I found what I initially believed were 
―non-Foucauldian‖ themes arising from the data, e.g. the theme of the support of others. 
 
In addition, a theme may be identified at either a manifest level or a latent level (Boyatzis, 
1998: 4). A manifest (or semantic, or explicit) level works with the surface meanings of the 
data; the analyst is not looking for anything beyond what a participant has said. 
Conversely, a latent (or interpretive) level goes beyond the semantic content and seeks to 
identify underlying or hidden ideas and concepts. ―Thus, for latent thematic analysis, the 
development of the themes themselves involves interpretive work, and the analysis that is 
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produced is not just description, but is already theorized‖ (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 84). 
Boyatzis (1998: 16) says thematic analysis enables the researcher to use both manifest and 
latent-content analysis at the same time. The coding in this study was a mixture of 
manifest and latent, but largely latent. 
 
When studying religion researchers also need to consider how subjects‘ own religious 
understanding is used. Hunt (2002: 90) writes that a preoccupation in past sociology of 
religion with social variables, roles and networks, meant there has been a neglect of the 
actor‘s interpretation of their own religious experience. He points to studies which place an 
emphasis on what people say about their experiences rather than focusing on sociological 
―causes‖. On this view if believers claim to be acting in the name of religion, we should 
attempt to understand their perspective on religious grounds first. This approach can also 
be derived from Weber‘s work (Furseth and Repstad, 2006: 35,37; Beckford, 2003: 19). As 
noted in chapter three, Foucault‘s thought can support the concept of the free experience of 
subjects, thus their subjective views of the world can be included in Foucauldian accounts 
of religion. 
 
In sum, the methodology used in this research is a manifest-latent, theoretical thematic 
analysis. Given the centrality of Foucault‘s theories in the current project, the role of 
discourse is discussed below. Discourse analysis is shown to be methodological as well as 
thematic. 
 
 
Foucault and Discourse. 
Foucault did not develop a fully worked out methodology, and criticised the very notion of 
formulating a single position according to Mills (2003: 111). Foucault tried to question the 
distinction between theory and analysis when he said ―theory does not express, translate or 
serve to apply practice: it is practice” (Mills, 2003: 110, emphasis mine). 
 
Foucault‘s methods are interpretive, as per the discussion of latent themes above. 
Interpretive or ―hermeneutic‖ methods do not make claims to discover objective truth; they 
merely present their own view of the truth (Rabinow and Sullivan, 1987: 1). Ultimately the 
confirmation or refutation of a particular (Foucauldian) discourse analysis depends on its 
persuasiveness to the community of social science researchers and scholars, according to 
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Howarth (2000: 141, 142). 
 
Foucauldian methods are not appropriate for discovering cultural meaning but are instead 
used to investigate techniques and practices such as ―management‖ and ―administration‖ 
(Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 117-122). Prior (1997: 65) concurs, writing that we do not 
need to ―seek out the ‗meaning‘ or authorial intent of texts.‖ 
 
Foucault‘s methods centre on ―discourse‖. Sarup (1996: 71) pithily defines the concept of 
a discourse as the production of ―things‖ by ―words‖. For Foucault, ―discourse is more 
than mere language; it is an institutionalized way of thinking, embedded in language, that 
shapes people‘s thoughts and behaviour‖ (Spickard, 2007:132). In simple terms, a 
discourse is ―What can be said‖. More specifically, what can be said at a particular 
moment in history. In his later period Foucault appears to substitute the term ―truth games‖ 
for discourses (Foucault, 1984e: 432). A discourse describes a body of knowledge. A 
discourse can be thought of as a ―discipline‖ both in the sense of scholarly disciplines and 
of disciplinary institutions such as prisons or the confessional (McHoul and Grace, 1993: 
26). As Nye writes (2008: 74): 
 
―Discourses do not simply describe our sense of reality; they give us the means by 
which we experience it. Thus on a simple level if I use the word ‗table‘ to describe 
(or name) a piece of wood, I might feel inclined to eat my dinner off it. If I use 
another word, for example, ‗altar‘, then it might seem inappropriate to use that 
same piece of wood for eating.‖ 
 
Foucault‘s discourses are based on statements, ―serious speech acts‖, linguistic acts where 
subjects can make ―serious truth claims because of their training, institutional location and 
mode of discourse‖ (Howarth, 2000: 55).  Thus, in Foucauldian terms, utterances about 
homosexuality become statements when spoken by a trained religious leader, in the pulpit 
of a church, backed up by Biblical quotations.  Statements ―may be related to each other to 
form discursive formations. To put things as simply as possible: Discursive formations are 
sets of rules about what can be said and what should not be said... in a particular social 
space‖ (Elder-Vass, 2012: 146). A discourse takes effect through its relation to another 
discourse. 
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Foucault is not interested in either the truth of statements or their meaning, but rather in the 
rules that form a particular discourse. Discourses are not passive objects subject to various 
external forces. According to Nye (2008: 72), ―discourses do not have the power in 
themselves, they are instead a means by which power relationships are expressed and 
constructed. Power relationships produce discourses, which act– in Foucault‘s phrase– as 
‗regimes of truth‘. Existing within such a regime makes it difficult to accept any other 
truth than that which is given by the dominant discourse.‖ 
 
Foucault‘s method is not only about language and the practices implicated in particular 
discourses, but also about ―the material conditions and social structures that form the 
context for these‖ (Burr, 2003: 170), which Foucault calls ―non-discursive forms‖. For 
example, Foucault‘s Madness and Civilisation does not start from madness itself, nor 
reason, but from the institutions that shut up the mad. A discourse may be identified by the 
institutions to which it relates– laboratory, asylum, church (Sarup, 1996: 70,71). The rules 
of formation of Christian discourse must be articulated with its non-discursive conditions 
such as the effects of secularisation. Changes in non-discursive conditions do not first 
change the consciousness of Christian pastors in order to change their discourse. Instead, 
non-discursive events ―transform the mode of existence of [religious] discourse: its 
conditions of emergence, insertion and functioning‖ (Torfing, 1999:90). We can also study 
the practices of the church as well as its institutional knowledge. 
 
Moon (2005: 552) says that Foucault‘s methods limited him to looking at ―elite 
productions of discourse‖ such as medicine, science or law. However, she emphasises that 
power is also reproduced in daily face-to-face interactions and that Foucault can be used to 
analyse ethnographic studies of ―micro-level‖ talk. Hacking (2004) agrees that a 
complementary micro-macro approach to social science is needed. These papers support 
the current study‘s use of ―micro‖ interview materials in combination with the ―macro‖ 
approach of Foucault‘s theory. 
 
 Although Foucault‘s method requires situating discourses in a larger history, it is also 
possible to focus on a limited period of history, as this current study does. Examples of this 
include studies by Prior (1997) and Moon (2005). Prior states (1997: 68), ―For practical 
research activities of course it would be unrealistic to suggest that qualitative researchers 
can immediately turn themselves into broad-brush historians... It is not, however, 
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unrealistic to suggest that qualitative researchers... ask questions about the points at which 
certain terms... appear and disappear.‖ 
 
One common solution to methodological problems with Foucault is to supplement him 
with other methods or theories, which can be called methodological pluralism. Riis (2009: 
242) writes that ―a methodological variety does not indicate a paradigm crisis. It can 
express a mature reflection on the methodological challenge of studying complex religion 
in a dynamic social environment.‖ Holstein & Gubrium (2005: 492) believe what is 
required is a new ―hybridized‖ analytics which ―co-opts‖ useful and complementary 
insights from established traditions. I would agree as my sense is that Foucault alone is not 
enough to do full justice to some qualitative accounts. Particularly with interview work, or 
where the data is very recent, or where there is simply little of it, another method is 
valuable. 
 
To summarise, Foucault‘s methods involve a study of: 
 Discourse– what can be said. 
 Practice– what people do. 
 Non-discursive forms– social structures and their context. 
 
 
Discourse and Thematic analysis. 
Given the centrality of discourse to Foucault‘s work I began to consider connections 
between themes and discourses. It is possible that discourses are themes. If so, in 
uncovering a discourse, one also uncovers a theme. Both themes and discourses can be 
latent (hidden) or manifest, either constructing us without our explicit awareness or 
consciously appropriated by subjects. For example the discourse of the disciplinary society 
in Discipline and punish could be used as a theme for interpreting interview data. 
Similarly, discourses of Christian asceticism could be utilised as a theme. 
 
However, I think themes and discourses are probably distinct; the former is 
methodological, the latter theoretical. In general themes do not construct us, they are 
merely methodological labels for analysis. Discourses have a larger role in Foucault‘s 
theory. Discourses and themes do share a common approach in identifying shared 
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meanings derived from spoken or written language (Elder-Vass, 2010: 147). It is only in 
this sense that themes parallel discourses. 
 
In sum, I am using thematic analysis because it is not wedded to one single approach, and 
can be combined with Foucault‘s theories. While I seek to identify discourses, I am not 
using (Foucauldian) discourse methodologically. In part this is because I think Foucault‘s 
methods prioritise the theorist and in this study I wanted to hear the interviewee. This is 
the balance that must be walked between inductive and deductive thematic analysis. 
 
 
4.4 Methods 
 
Methods describe how the data for this study was gathered and analysed. In this research 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews, also called ―informal conversational 
interviews‖, were used to generate data (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 705, Johnson and 
Christensen, 2008:208). Interviews of between one and two hours duration were separately 
conducted with twelve men, of whom most attended different churches. The interviews 
were usually conducted in the mens‘ own homes and I travelled to other cities for this 
purpose. Due to time and travel constraints some interviews were conducted via ―Skype‖ 
video conference. One interview was conducted in a public cafe at the suggestion of the 
participant. Two interviews were conducted in the home of a friend of the participant. One 
participant was away from home at the time and this arrangement was mutually 
convenient. The second participant was not ―out‖ to his church and was cautious about 
discussing his faith and sexuality with a stranger. This participant also asked to see the 
transcript of his interview. The others declined this offer; however all of them wished to 
read the finished thesis.  The interviews were informal in style, and were based around the 
schedule of interview questions in the appendix. Following a semi-structured method, 
interviews could vary from this schedule; questions could be phrased in a different way or 
asked at a different point in the interview. I found that the men sometimes anticipated and 
answered questions during their initial narrative. In this case I would investigate the lead 
further. Conversely, if the conversation wandered and a topic had not been covered I would 
return to it later. 
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Participants were selected through personal contacts and what has been termed 
―snowballing‖– asking participants if they know others who may be suitable research 
subjects. A disadvantage of this method is that snowballing may only obtain people who 
are similar. For example the men in the current study tend to be in the same age group and 
social strata– they are all white and broadly middle to upper middle class. (The participants 
are introduced in more detail in chapter five.) It was hoped that men aged both over 50 and 
under 30 could be interviewed so that age differences might be considered in relation to 
homosexual law reform in New Zealand. In practice the use of snowballing may have 
limited the range of participant ages. For present purposes this is acceptable as this study is 
not focused on social variables such as ethnicity or class; this study is not intended to be 
representative of the wider gay Christian population. The similarity of participants can be 
seen as a strength rather than a liability, perhaps yielding a greater degree of reliability by 
focusing on a smaller population. 
 
 
Sample Size. 
I aimed to find between ten and fifteen participants to interview, hoping thereby to achieve 
―theoretical saturation‖ (explained below). I decided to halt data collection after twelve 
interviews for several reasons. Firstly, it was becoming harder to acquire new participants 
via ―snowballing‖. In addition to this I was running into project time constraints. One 
participant withdrew due to his own busy schedule. Most importantly, I was satisfied that 
sufficient data had been collected. ―Small‖ sample sizes are common in qualitative 
research as compared to quantitative (Mason, 2010). One of the reasons for small sample 
sizes is that there is a point of diminishing return in a qualitative sample– more data does 
not necessarily lead to more information. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, only 
one occurrence of a piece of data or code is all that is required for it to become part of the 
analysis. Secondly, ―one occurrence of the data is potentially as useful as many in 
understanding the process behind a topic‖ (Mason, 2010: 1). Thirdly, qualitative research 
is labour intensive and analysing a large sample can be time consuming and impractical. It 
can also be noted that a single interview does not necessarily equate to a single point of 
data; it can generate multiple instances of a particular variable being studied. 
 
Qualitative approaches usually involve ―purposeful sampling‖ whereas quantitative 
approaches usually involve probability sampling. Purposeful sampling seeks in-depth 
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study of information-rich cases. Qualitative research values deep understanding, whereas 
quantitative research values the ability to generalise to larger populations from a 
statistically representative sample.  
 
Researchers generally use the concept of ―informational redundancy‖ or ―theoretical 
saturation‖ to guide their data collection. Saturation is defined as ―when the collection of 
new data does not shed any further light on the issue under investigation‖ (Mason, 2010: 
2). Achieving saturation is an ideal and difficult to identify. Sandelowski (1995: 183) says 
that determining an adequate sample size is ―ultimately a matter of judgement and 
experience‖ on the part of the researcher. Different kinds of purposeful sampling require 
different minimum sample sizes. Sandelowski (1995: 181) states that ―in deviant case 
sampling, where the intention is to understand a very unusual or atypical manifestation of 
some phenomenon, one case may be sufficient.‖ In line with her assertion, I consider the 
subject matter of this thesis– gay Christians who attend church– is sufficiently unusual to 
be usefully served by the current sample number. 
 
 
Research Ethics. 
This study was carried out with ethics approval from Victoria University of Wellington 
(#19413, 28 August 2012), and with signed agreement from participants. All the interviews 
were digitally recorded and then transcribed. Names and addresses of participants were 
kept separately from these files. Participants understood that all files and recordings would 
be destroyed once the research was completed. Prior to arranging interviews potential 
participants were provided with background information which explained how 
confidentiality would be maintained. At the beginning of each interview I reiterated my 
agreement to keep information confidential, and that they could terminate the interview at 
any time or decline to answer particular questions. To ensure privacy pseudonyms are used 
in excerpts from the transcripts, and some other details may be changed to avoid possible 
identification of participants (occupation, place of work, city of residence, name of 
church). Participants were offered the chance to review and edit their transcripts, but only 
one wished to do so. Examples of the background information and ethics approval forms 
sent to participants are included in the appendix. The interviewees are introduced in the 
next chapter. 
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Locating the Researcher.  
I echo Melissa Wilcox‘s statement that this is not a study about homosexuality, nor is it 
about religion or churches (Wilcox, 2003, p. ix). It is a study about people. While I do not 
appear in the study as a subject, my role as researcher needs to be located. I agree with 
feminist, queer and postmodern theory that academic study cannot be hermetically sealed 
from the personal; I cannot completely remove myself as observer and any biases I have 
need to be acknowledged. 
 
I came to this research as an outsider, which brings both strengths and weaknesses. I am 
not a gay man, I identify as heterosexual. Some may see this as a deficiency. Dyer (1997: 
273) contends that lesbian and gay studies are created only by those who openly identify as 
homosexual, ―or by those who study it on our terms‖, and I seek to honour this.19 Plummer 
(2005: 361) suggests queer theory devolves from a ―critical humanism‖ which 
encompasses values including human rights, care and compassion, recognition, respect and 
trust. These accord with values I seek to embody. I also no longer call myself a Christian 
which puts me outside the faith of those I interviewed, but I believe I bring a sympathetic 
ear to their views. 
  
In the following chapters I conduct a thematic analysis of the interviews. The transcripts 
are analysed under the categories of Belonging and Exclusion; Belief, Knowledge, Power 
and The Care of the Christian Self. 
 
                                               
19 I am grateful for the advice of a sociologist who identifies as gay, who assured me that queer studies is no 
longer dogmatic about the requirement of a queer orientation in those who do such research. 
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 5 
Belonging and Exclusion 
 
 
“The development toward which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of 
friendship.” 
(Foucault, 1981: 308) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter begins by introducing the men who were interviewed. Following this I 
analyse the research findings under the themes of Belonging and Exclusion. 
 
 
5.1 Introducing The Participants 
 
The participants who were interviewed are listed in the table below. Names and other 
identifying details have been changed. 
 
 Name Age Church 
1  Dave  48  Baptist 
2  Kelvin  51  Salvation Army 
3  John  59  Gay Church° and Baptist 
4  Trevor  52  Pentecostal 
5  Harry  65  Evangelical Denomination Ɵ 
6  Mike  75  Anglican 
7  Chris  28  Baptist ǂ 
8  Edward  69  Gay Church° and Independent Evangelical Ɵ 
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9  Colin  50  Salvation Army 
10  Bruce  58  Baptist 
11  Adam  57  Gay Church° and Pentecostal 
12  Scott  64  Anglican 
 
° Independent Anglican-based GLBT congregation. 
Ɵ The participant did not want his church identified. 
ǂ This was the last church Chris attended. 
 
 All interviewees were of European descent and most were in professional careers, six 
were self-employed running their own business. Two participants had been employed as 
clergy. Most respondents had high income relative to the general New Zealand population. 
Most lived in New Zealand cities, two lived in small towns. Most of the men I interviewed 
were tertiary educated, 10 of 12 had at least an undergraduate degree compared with 
approximately 11 percent of the New Zealand population (Henrickson, 2007: 70). Four– 
John, Dave, Mike and Scott– had theology degrees. All interviewees identified as 
homosexual, other sexualities such as bisexuality were not addressed in this study. Four– 
Harry, Bruce, Adam and Scott– had previously been married to women (two were 
divorced, two widowed) and had grown-up children. 
 
Participants were recruited on the basis that they identified as Christians. Most of those 
interviewed were brought up as Christians; Dave, Mike and Adam were not. Chris, a 
former Christian who now calls himself an atheist, was included because I felt his 
perspective would be useful. He was also the youngest, at 28. Six men were in their 50s, 
three were in their 60s and one was 75. As noted in the methodology chapter, the use of 
‗snowballing‘ to acquire participants may have inevitably restricted the study to an older 
peer group. This could also be an advantage in that older men have had more time to 
reconcile their gay and Christian life. They can also remember the time when 
homosexuality was illegal in New Zealand, giving them an ability to reflect on social 
changes versus changes in the Church. 
 
As can be seen from the table, all attended a mixture of protestant churches. Surprisingly, 
the majority were evangelical and pentecostal churches, traditionally regarded as 
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conservative. One of the Baptist churches could be regarded as somewhat liberal for that 
denomination. A few attended a gay congregation in addition to their preferred church. As 
it transpired, not all interviewees were ―out‖ to their churches. Trevor, for example, was 
out to his three pastors, but not to his pentecostal congregation as a whole. Harry was not 
out to his evangelical church nor Edward to his independent evangelical church, although 
both attended a separate gay congregation. This accords with Yip‘s (1997: 116, 119) study 
where some respondents chose to tell only those who needed to know. 
 
The participants can be compared with the 2004 New Zealand ―Lavender Islands‖ study of 
2,269 LGB participants, of whom 54.7% were male (Henrickson, 2007: 70). In that study 
that 55.5% of gay men believed in a spiritual force, god or gods. Furthermore, 14.8 % of 
these respondents were Christians, a higher percentage than might be expected from gays‘ 
overall negative experiences with church. However, it appeared from analysis of the 
Lavender Islands study that LGB respondents are disaffiliating with Christianity at a rate 
2.37 times the general population (Henrickson, 2007: 73). ―Current Christian‖ respondents 
in the Lavender Islands study were significantly older which may indicate a generational 
trend as older respondents were also generally more likely to have faith in a spiritual force. 
Interestingly, respondents generally did not believe that there was such a thing as a 
―lesbian/gay spirituality‖ (Henrickson, 2007: 77). 
 
I initially attempted to categorise participants against Hervieu-Léger‘s (1998) four primary 
dimensions of Christianity– emotional, communal, cultural, ethical (Fig 1, and see chapter 
two). 
 
 
 In her model Hervieu-Léger combines two of these dimensions to come up with a ―type‖. 
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Taking the example of one of the evangelical participants in this study, on Hervieu-Léger‘s 
model he would likely identify with the communal and cultural axes. In brief, he would 
have clear boundaries around group membership and a focus on the Bible and its 
interpretation. Hervieu-Léger (1998: 224) denotes this communal-cultural combination 
―patrimonial Christianity‖20. 
 
However, I have a sense that Hervieu-Léger‘s categories do not quite fit the current data– 
they do not fully tell the story of these men‘s religious life. The evangelical man just 
described, for example would also strongly identify with emotional and ethical dimensions 
of the model– experiencing feelings of warmth and belonging, and attachment to 
evangelical values. Thus, all four dimensions are relevant. In utilising only two dimensions 
to come up with a ―type‖ this model fails to describe important aspects of Christian 
experience. 
 
This parallels the difficulty of categorising Christians using terms like ―liberal‖ and 
―conservative‖ when peoples‘ lives and faiths are complex. Even though gay Christian 
organisations tend to be liberal on many fronts (Hunt, 2009: 13), a person attending a 
―liberal‖ gay church may have a ―conservative‖ faith, as John, Harry, Edward and Adam 
did in this study. The same is true in reverse; Kelvin, Colin and Trevor attended 
conservative congregations but arguably had broader beliefs. 
 
Chris rejected Christian identity in favour of gay identity, a common mode of resolving 
this conflict (Ganzevoort et al, 2011: 218). However, his rejection of Christianity was not 
based only on the ‗gay issue‘, he felt uncomfortable with churches‘ positions on other 
social issues. One man, Colin, described himself as ―spiritual‖: 
 
I do see myself as probably a bit more spiritual rather 
than just Christian. I'm on my own path at the moment 
with that. … I guess for me its very much connected 
with nature, with the world. … But it's also connected 
with Christianity, with my faith, with something like 
that. To me I see God in all that. So there's been a 
                                               
20
 The full list includes Emotional Christianity, Patrimonial Christianity, Humanitarian Christianity, Political 
Christianity, Humanist Christianity, Aesthetic Christianity (Hervieu-Léger, 1998). 
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spirituality there all the time. 
 
Scott called himself a ―contemplative‖, and used the term ―spiritual‖ several times in his 
interview. Some commentators identify the emergence of ―spirituality‖ as a new 
development in the sociology of religion (Wuthnow, 2001; Flanagan et al, 2007). 
Wuthnow (2001: 307) defines spirituality as ―a state of being related to a divine, 
supernatural or transcendent order of reality‖, or alternatively, ―a sense or awareness of a 
suprareality that goes beyond life as ordinarily experienced.‖ Spirituality is largely seen by 
practitioners as opposed to religion, particularly ―organised religion‖. However, to be 
useful this term needs to be distinguished from religion in general, and from New Age 
religions in particular. I consider this a problem for studies of spirituality. Hunt (2002) is 
also critical of such approaches. Foucault‘s definition of spirituality refers to a ―certain 
mode of being‖ and to ―the transformations which the subject must make of himself in 
order to accede to this mode of being‖ (Carrette, 1999: 1). As only two men used the term 
―spiritual‖ to define themselves I did not pursue the concept of spirituality further. 
 
Chris Brickell and Ben Taylor (2004: 146) ask what it means to be a gay man in New 
Zealand in relation to notions of masculinity and heterosexuality. Their study found New 
Zealand gay men made ―little use of the notion of subversion and are instead typically 
modernist, prioritising self-discovery and authentic self-expression.‖ A popular stereotype 
typifies gay men as effeminate or ―camp‖, which Trevor alluded to: 
 
Interviewer: What can gays offer the church? 
 
Trev: Decorating? (laughs) 
 
In other words, homosexual men are seen as skilled in ‗feminine‘ roles like decorating or 
fashion, not in ‗masculine‘ roles like building or sports. However this stereotype did not 
hold for most of the men I interviewed. Some embodied conventional masculinity, with a 
―Kiwi bloke‖ demeanour. Trevor, for example, had a farming background and Bruce was 
active in sports and working on a major home renovation. 
 
All men seem to have reached a point where they were reconciled with their Christian and 
gay life. For example, from the interview with John: 
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Interviewer: You sound, John, that you're very 
comfortable with where you're at in your journey. Would 
that be fair? 
 
John. Yes, that's fair, fair comment. 
 
Trev said he had reached the point where: 
 
… rather than try to keep changing things or try to 
hate where I was at, maybe just accept it [being gay] 
and think, OK, how do you honour God in the situation 
you're in. So that's where I'm at now. 
 
Bruce commented: 
 
Being gay is not my identity. … It’s a facet to my 
personality, it doesn’t define who I am. 
 
He added later: 
 
Being Christian is something who I am and it’s not an 
option. And, over time I have also come to realise that 
being gay is who I am. … God doesn’t make junk. 
  
Adam had spent over ten years heavily involved with an ―ex-gay‖ ministry. He did not not 
express antagonism, describing them as ―really loving and supportive‖, but since leaving 
the group he had completely reconciled his sexuality with his faith: 
 
Adam: 
The last couple of years as I've settled in with my 
identity, at the same time as that, I had a huge 
revelation of God's unconditional love, and grace. 
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The men in this study represent examples of what Ganzevoort et al (2011: 219) term 
―integration‖ of their gay and Christian identities. ―In this mode one does not see these 
elements as mutually exclusive any more, even though the groups one belongs to may still 
be antagonistic towards each other. The integrator overcomes this antagonism and instead 
develops an identity that includes both the religious and the homosexual elements.‖ 
 
A possible exception is Harry who said that apart from the issue of sex, if he could he 
would choose to be in a heterosexual marriage ―because the rules of engagement are 
clearer.‖ Harry was one of four men previously married to women. However, he was still 
comfortable with himself by his own account and this did not seem a major issue. 
 
There was vastly more in the interview transcripts than I can adequately summarise. In 
reviewing the interviews it struck me that there is considerable diversity among gay 
Christians. It is important to point this out. Although thematic analysis looks for 
commonality, this diversity should be upheld. 
 
The first theme I drew from the data is belonging, through the Support of Others. 
 
 
5.2 The Support Of Others 
 
A common theme for several participants was the value of support from other people: 
 
Interviewer: 
Is there anything that’s been important in helping you 
or empowering you in your journey with coming to terms 
with being Christian and gay? 
 
Dave: 
Other gay Christian people. Who may just a little bit 
further along the path, or not necessarily further 
along the path. Kindred spirits. Asking similar 
questions to me. … But also, Christians who are not 
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gay. Because what my faith is about is inclusiveness. 
That’s why I go to [Baptist church], because it’s a 
mixture of people who go there. They’re not all gay. 
So, yeah, it’s not just gays who have helped me, it’s 
other Christians [too]. 
 
John: 
I think it's tremendously helpful to have other friends 
around you, in the same situation, with whom you can be 
honest about struggles and circumstances. … because 
none of us are meant to walk a journey like this alone. 
 
Adam: 
[I have] a close network of friends, Christian friends. 
They know me and they love me and they don't care about 
my sexuality. 
 
Clergy had been helpful to some of the men, for example Trevor mentioned a prison 
chaplain who was supportive when he came out, and also one of his pastors in the 
Pentecostal church, with whom he‘d recently had coffee: 
 
There are people who do know where I'm at that don't 
treat me differently. This guy [pastor] I talked to 
last week, he was good. I felt a little bit understood. 
 
Edward mentioned help from an elder in the small town Brethren church he used to attend. 
A few men had been able to find traditional churches that were extremely supportive: 
 
Kelvin: 
There’s a lot of people who have been very 
understanding, one of the pastors at [location] 
Salvation Army has been very empathetic and very 
understanding … Yeah, just a lot of people who have 
been very non-judgemental, just accepting of who I am 
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and are very encouraging. People who I thought would 
not be, for example people very high up in the 
Salvation Army who just totally accepted Colin and I 
for example. That kind of encouragement has gone a long 
way to help me in my belief and restoring my faith 
really. 
 
Colin also described his current church experience as ―wonderful‖. 
 
Some of the men were not able to openly attend the type of church they preferred. John 
expressed an unfulfilled desire to return to a Brethren church and Edward also preferred a 
church with ―expository Bible preaching‖. Two interviewees attended an evangelical 
church to get the spiritual nourishment they desired, and attended a separate gay-friendly 
congregation for support. Moving to a more accepting religious group is one way that 
homosexual Christians integrate both sides of their life (Ganzevoort et al, 2011: 219). 
 
Several men described the benefit of a local gay Christian support group, which advertised 
in a national denominational newspaper. Mike said what had supported him was ―love‖ by 
which I understood him to mean the love of his partners and gay friends. Relationships 
such as these are part of the ―power of personal experience‖ (Yip, 1997: 108) which helps 
gay men come to accept their sexuality in the context of their faith. On finding their 
sexuality is problematic to the churches, gay Christians undergo a process of reflexivity 
and self-evaluation, learning to trust their personal experiences (Yip, 1997: 143). Their 
lived experiences become their ultimate referential framework. 
 
I continue by examining the theme of belonging through two lenses: an analysis of 
friendship, and an analysis of community. 
 
 
Friendship. 
Friendship expresses support and belonging through shared understandings and affective 
bonds. It can be contrasted with kinship or professional ties which exist for more explicit 
reasons; even marriage or cohabitation is associated with discourses concerning social 
location. A small body of scholarship in sociology seeks to study friendship, for example 
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Pahl (2000), Pahl and Spencer (2006), Adams and Allen (1998). Outside the rubric of 
‗sociology of friendship‘ but of particular relevance to gay friendships, Jeffrey Weeks, et al 
(2001) have written on the emergence of ―families of choice‖ in non-heterosexual groups, 
as ―experiments‖ in alternatives to kinship-based families. They give the example of gay 
men (and women) who consider their friends to be their family (Weeks et al, 2001: 10). 
―For many individuals who are not in long-term relationships, as well as for those who are, 
friendships as families of choice are the prime focus of emotional support‖ (Weeks et al, 
2001: 58). Pahl and Spencer (2006: 132) describe the existence of ―friend- based personal 
communities‖ as chosen communities where people are included because of the intrinstic 
quality of the relationship, rather than for cultural or normative reasons.  
 
How might Foucault theorise the support and care of friends? In his last years Foucault 
―returned time and time again to the theme of friendship‖ (Bernauer, 2005: 569) seeking 
how it might transform our culture. Roach (2005: 58) cautions that Foucault‘s formulations 
of friendship are ―vague‖ and the references ―scant‖, however some useful ideas may be 
raised. The interview Friendship as a Way of Life (Foucault, 1981) is an important text. 
Appropriately for our current concern, Foucault aligns friendship with homosexual 
relationships: 
 
―Another thing to distrust is the tendency to relate the question of homosexuality to 
the problem of ‗Who am I?‘ and ‗What is the secret of my desire?‘ Perhaps it would 
be better to ask oneself, ‗What relations, through homosexuality, can be 
established, invented, multiplied, and modulated?‘ The problem is not to discover 
in oneself the truth of one‘s sex, but, rather, to use one‘s sexuality henceforth to 
arrive at a multiplicity of relationships. And, no doubt, that‘s the real reason why 
homosexuality is not a form of desire but something desirable. Therefore, we have 
to work at becoming homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing that we are. 
The development toward which the problem of homosexuality tends is the one of 
friendship.‖ 
(Foucault, 1981: 308) 
 
Firstly, Roach (2005: 58) claims that Foucault is ―quite insistent on the value of friendship 
for the gay community‖, which accords with the experiences of the men in this study. 
―While marriage is not an option for queers in most of the world, friendship, however 
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imperfect, always has been‖ (Roach, 2012: 14). However, although gay liberation is an 
important stage for Foucault, it is not the main point. The acts and desires that may occur 
within same sex relations are not for Foucault of primary importance. He looks beyond 
sexuality to find new forms of ―multiple‖ relations. It is in the tying together of 
―unforeseen lines of force‖ and the formation of new alliances that new types of 
relationship are envisaged. 
 
Secondly, Foucault calls for us to experience a ―multiplicity of relationships‖; exploring 
friendship is a way in which homosexuality– and perhaps all of society– can develop 
further. Roach (2005: 57) believes Foucault sees friendship as leading to a new kind of 
relation, ―friendship as a way of life‖. These ideas seem to have similarities with Weeks‘ 
communities of choice, above. 
 
As Webb (2003) summarises, ―Foucault‘s work suggests that friendship emerges from the 
complex system of relations that condition who we are and how we can act. Friends are 
those with whom we work on the historical conditions of existence, and those with whom 
we share the practice of becoming who we are.‖ Friendship can thus be seen as a practice, 
a technique of the self. Friendship as a Foucauldian practice supports the construction of a 
Christian self (chapter seven). In ancient times the practices of self care were far from 
solitary (Webb 2003: 132). In Foucault‘s words: 
 
―Around the care of the self, there developed an entire activity of speaking and 
writing in which the work of oneself on oneself and communication with others 
were linked together‖ (HS3: 51). 
 
And: 
 
―All this attention to the self did not depend solely on the existence of schools, 
lectures and professionals of spiritual direction for its social base; it found a ready 
support in the whole bundle of customary relations of kinship, friendship and 
obligation. (HS3: 52). 
 
Friendship might also be described as a productive power relation, another form of the 
self-empowerment discussed in the next chapters. Before this I want to briefly connect 
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friendship with the concept of community. 
 
 
Community. 
For present purposes I will use ―community‖ to describe a set of social relations where 
participants have a common sense of identity (Marshall, 1998: 97) 
21
. This term was used 
in the interviews; Trevor expressed an ideal around a church being a community: 
 
Trevor: 
I really think that as part of, like, living faith that 
if you go into any church you belong to that community. 
That's what I think is the ideal, you know? 
 
Colin and others used the term ―fellowship‖: 
 
Colin: 
I go to church for fellowship. And to keep me connected 
with God. 
 
In theological discourse, fellowship ―implies persons in association, participation, and 
communion with one another or with the divine persons‖ (Lewis and Demarest, 1994: 
156). The term is important and frequently used in Christian discourse. The concepts of 
fellowship and community share features in common, for example the idea of of ―persons 
in association, participation, and communion with one another‖22. 
 
Like friendship, the concept of community expresses belonging. Bernauer (2005: 568) 
connects Foucault‘s work on friendship with the idea of community as does Roach (2012: 
14) who believes Foucault contemplated ―communities of friends‖. I wondered whether 
these communities of friends might prefigure Giorgio Agamben‘s Coming Community 
                                               
21
 Humphrey (2012: 155 - 158) cautions the ―constant discovery‖ of community by social scientists is really 
just another way of saying that people experience social bonds and that it may be too vague to usefully 
describe collectives. While I consider his point has merit, I use ‗community‘ here in lieu of a better term. 
22
 In fact, the very origins of sociology lie in an exploration of fellowship according to Stauth and Turner 
(1998: 3). 
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(1990) and whether the interview data could be theorised in this way.
23
 Agamben 
introduces new ways in which community might be conceived by leaving the requirement 
of shared identity behind. He invokes a community of ―whatever-being‖, which Roach 
(2012: 149) interprets as the Foucauldian community of friends. According to Agamben, 
the coming community will be made up of a ―singularity‖. People will not belong to any 
class (such as being French, or Christian, or gay) or have anything in common except 
being itself (Agamben, 1990: 1,2). Agamben‘s new and seemingly powerless community 
also has political power because: 
 
―What the state cannot tolerate in any way... is that the singularities form a 
community without affirming an identity.‖ 
 (Agamben, 1990: 38) 
 
Because Agamben‘s coming community does not affirm one uniform identity it is 
threatening to the state, because a state can only manage identifiable subjects. In fact, 
Humphrey (2012) believes that the term ―community‖ itself is currently used by the state 
to support its agenda. 
 
Community has previously been conceived around identity. However, Webb (2003: 136) 
believes that for Foucault ―it is a matter of secondary importance whether my friend is like 
me or unlike me. What matters most is the practice we share and the paths that we follow.‖ 
This could be seen as a Foucauldian affirmation of Agamben‘s ―community without 
identity‖. The community without identity is neither particular or universal (Agamben, 
1990: 1,2). This idea is possibly easier described by saying what it is not. I think Agamben 
imagines a community which is neither human (a universal) nor gay, white and male 
(particular). A community neither Christian (universal) nor Baptist, heterosexual and 
middle-class (particular). 
 
The coming community has its own power and language, external power does not have a 
hold on it. Following this line of thought, I suggest gay people who resist the dominant 
church discourse are developing their own power and their own language. It is in this 
respect– and perhaps this respect only– that they demonstrate the ―coming community‖. I 
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 Agamben claims Foucault as a major influence (Durantaye, 2009: 209). 
Chapter 5 
 
68 
 
do not claim gay Christians are the paradigm of the coming community, only that it is 
useful to view them through this lens. 
 
However, solving the problem of conflict between distinct communities by erasing all 
distinctions seems likely to be unpopular with many groups including gay Christians, for 
whom ―identity politics‖ have become important. Foucault might also disagree with 
Agamben; in one interview he says the idea that one day there will no longer be any 
difference between homo- and heterosexuality is a myth (Foucault,1981: 308). 
 
I have examined friendship and community as part of the theme of belonging, its converse 
is exclusion: 
 
 
5.3 Exclusion 
 
Most of the interviews contained stories of rejection by the Church and so it is important to 
comment on this. As Chris observed: 
 
You never really get over coming out in a conservative 
church. 
 
John, for example, was asked to leave the boards of several Christian organisations once 
he came out. In another example, when he was a young man attending a pentecostal church 
Kelvin‘s homosexuality was seen as ―demonic‖, and he endured attempts to exorcise the 
unwanted spirits. Exorcism was also attempted on another of the interviewees. I consider 
these overt acts of exclusion. Trevor did not feel excluded in an overt way, for example by 
not being invited to meetings. However, he did feel there was an underlying ethos of 
opposition: 
 
Trev: 
It's not like direct opposition or anything like that, 
but it's kind of like, you kind of just get the feeling 
that there's kind of... I'm not sure what I'm trying to 
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say. It's not directly opposition about someone who's 
gay, but indirectly it is. 
 
 Harry spoke of feeling ―alienation‖ as the result of a former pastor‘s attitudes: 
  
 Harry: 
It’s not as if he [the pastor] would present a study of 
[homosexuality], but he would say things like “people 
with their rainbow flags” etc and, you know, make a 
joke, or put them down in some way. 
  
Harry noted that ―I wasn‘t the only person he excluded at all‖, describing much of what 
occurred in that church as struggles over authoritarian leadership rather than anti-
homosexual pressure. Chris gave the example of his conservative Baptist church offering 
to allow his boyfriend to attend church with him when he came out in his late teens. The 
church believed they were being kind and reasonable but Chris felt that at a fundamental 
level they did not really understand. The ethos still didn‘t feel welcoming, which is what he 
sought. 
 
Based on these comments I began to consider the idea that exclusion can actually be 
subtle, covert rather than overt. Covert exclusion is implicit, it occurs undercover. It is 
expressed in the feeling that one is not wanted and does not belong. The experience of 
exclusion is familiar to marginalised groups. Michelle Erai (2004: 44) writes of the 
―exclusionary exile‖ based on gender and race in New Zealand. She ends by embracing an 
implied self-exile: ―My personal solution to being queer in Aotearoa/New Zealand? Exile.‖ 
Self-exile, removing oneself from oppositional groups is an option gay Christians can take. 
As discussed above, a sense of exclusion often leads to gay Christians changing church or 
leaving altogether. Almost all of those interviewed moved to different churches in seeking 
to reconcile their gay and Christian lives. I think in Foucauldian terms moving church can 
be seen as an empowering choice, an act of resistance. Vasey (1995: 249) describes a New 
Testament passage which points to Jesus as one who shares the experience of exclusion 
with homosexual Christians. I see this interpretation as an example of gay Christians 
developing new discourses which resist the dominant Christian discourse. 
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Another way of reconciling the gay-Christian dimension is ―detraditionalization‖ where a 
believer rejects some aspects of their faith tradition (Yip, 2003: 136). Detraditionalization 
does not involve the total disappearance of tradition. Heelas (1998) espouses a 
―coexistence thesis‖ which argues that the self and traditions coexist and intermingle in 
constructing a person‘s social life. Similarly, Furseth and Repstad (2006: 123) suggest it is 
possible today to take part in religious communities ―without fully supporting the official 
dogma or even having a definite faith in them.‖ For example, Kelvin and his partner Colin 
now attend a Salvation Army church even though its official stance is not pro gay. I want 
to conclude by briefly examining two ideas for thinking about exclusion, the idea of the 
stranger and the idea of otherness. 
 
Georg Simmel‘s concept of the stranger can illuminate gay Christians‘ experiences of 
being both inside and outside the group 
24
. It seems to me that when churches exclude 
someone they conceive them as a ―stranger‖ in this sense. Simmel‘s stranger is constructed 
out of the social interaction between outsiders (homosexuals) and insiders (the church). 
However, ―the stranger is an element of the group itself ... an element whose membership 
in the group involves being both being outside it and confronting it.‖ The stranger has a 
―synthesis of nearness and remoteness‖ (Simmel, 1971: 144,145). The stranger gives the 
group something useful, which it needs: ―The stranger‘s ability to listen and to theorize 
possibilities, from society‘s margins, allowed for a freedom not found in the group 
membership itself‖. But it is this freedom that threatens the group. Simmel believes that 
the stranger‘s ability to name ―dangerous possibilities‖ was established by society‘s ability 
to simultaneously construct the stranger as ―close to us and far from us‖ (Erickson, 2001: 
110). 
 
 A stranger is perceived to have a quality in common with many other strangers. ―For this 
reason strangers are not really perceived as individuals, but as strangers of a certain type‖ 
(Simmel, 1971: 148). He gives the example of the middle ages where all Jews were taxed 
identically, as they were all regarded the same. In a similar way, Trevor spoke of 
stereotypes about gays, who he said are all regarded by Christians as the same. 
 
Exclusion can also lead to the idea of otherness. In Christian discourse a gay Christian is 
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 Also see Williams et al (2005), The Social Outcast. 
Chapter 5 
 
71 
 
an alterity, an ―other‖ which resists normalisation. In fact, Christian discourse may be 
founded in a rejection of difference at a fundamental level due to its reciprocal influence 
on Western philosophy. According to Emmanuel Levinas, Western philosophy is focused 
on ideas of totality and the One. Hence any alterity vanishes as theory tries to explain it: 
―the relation with the Other is only possible through assimilation into the self‖ 
(Sarup,1996: 68). Language‘s function, for Levinas, is to suppress the other and make it 
the same as the ‗normal‘. In response to this problem, ―Levinas proposes not the 
ontological subject but an ethical subject defined in relation to the Other. It follows from 
this argument that there must be respect for the Other‘s heterogeneity‖ Sarup (1996: 68). 
He proposes that ethics, in the sense of respecting difference, is the basis of relationship, 
not ontology. On this view, Christians would be less focused on whether someone is gay 
(ontology) but on relationship with this ―other‖ person25. Thus, Western (and Christian) 
discourse does not approve of otherness, it seeks to normalise sexuality. It seems clear that 
Christian discourse presupposes a heterosexual human nature: 
 
Trevor: 
If you don't say anything, people just treat you like 
you're heterosexual. You know, “When are you getting 
married?” or “Where's your partner?” 
 
In Christian discourse to be seen as Christian is also to be seen as heterosexual. In fact, 
both gay and Christian communities regard ―gay Christians‖ as deviant. However, the 
discourses of the men in this research show they have walked their own path and 
developed their own self-construction (see chapter seven). 
 
 
In summary, the experiences of the gay men studied here can be analysed under the themes 
of Belonging and Exclusion. While gay Christians‘ experience of otherness is 
acknowledged, this study emphasises the positive power of friendship, support and 
community in gay Christian lives.
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  This view is quite different to Foucault‘s ethics which were focused not on ontology or relationship, but 
on the self. 
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6 
Belief, Knowledge, Power 
 
 
―It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On 
the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within 
the body by the functioning of a power.‖ 
– DP: 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this chapter the research data is analysed around the themes of Belief, Knowledge and 
Power in religion. These themes developed in two ways. Firstly, belief as 
knowledge/power developed in a ―bottom-up‖ or inductive way, it was triggered by a 
question which seemed to emerge from the data. The analysis of religion and productive 
power relations largely developed using a ―top-down‖ methodology, although even here 
some details seemed to ―emerge‖ rather than be imposed. 
  
  
6.1 Belief As Knowledge/Power 
 
Sarup (1996: 72) explains that ―power/knowledge is a device for studying the social and 
scientific practices that underlie and condition the formation of beliefs‖. In this section I 
focus on the element of belief itself. Study participants were asked about their beliefs and 
responded in a variety of ways: 
 
 Interviewer: 
Tell me tell me a bit more about your beliefs now, 
theologically, or however you'd like to describe 
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yourself?  
 
 Colin: 
Let's start with God. OK, obviously I believe in God. I 
don't believe that Christianity is the only way, to the 
exclusion of all other religions. 
I respect other religions and other faiths. 
 
John self-identified as evangelical, but stressed elsewhere that the Bible needs to be be 
―rightly interpreted‖: 
 
John: 
I would still very definitely call myself evangelical. 
And that means that's difficult because the churches 
I'm going to would all be pretty uncomfortable with 
those labels. … The gay friendly churches are not 
evangelical. 
 
Here theological discourses, a formal ―Christian knowledge‖, are explicitly connected with 
belief. Within a religious apparatus theology can be a key discourse that believers use to 
construct a self, and which constructs them in turn. Kelvin spoke of his beliefs in the 
following way: 
 
Kelvin: 
I definitely am a Christian believer, I’m definitely 
quite liberal in my beliefs. I’m definitely not a 
literal bible believer. I don’t believe that every 
single word in the bible is as it is, I have quite a 
liberal view of the bible. 
 
And later: 
 
I have a really strong belief that Christ is my saviour 
and that he died to save me. 
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The phrase ―Christian believer‖ indicates the strong role that belief has in the Christian 
apparatus. Kelvin identified his beliefs around the Bible as ―more liberal‖ but also 
expressed his faith in traditional Christian terms. None of the participants had what might 
be called ―simple‖ or naïve beliefs. For example: 
 
Trevor: 
I would say that I'm a Bible believer. I think. But 
it's kind of like, what does that mean, eh? [laughs]... 
As you get older you see more and you realise that 
there's a whole lot more and somehow it's all gotta fit 
sorta thing? So kind of, how does it all fit? 
 
I think some things you let go and some things you hold 
onto. I think I believe less about less things, ... but 
there's certain things I try to just hold onto that 
kinda simplify faith right down to the bare minimum 
sort of thing. 
 
Here Trevor realises that being a ―Bible believer‖ requires nuanced understanding. His 
comments about believing less and simplifying his faith should be read in the sense of a 
mature reflection and parsing of what is important. 
 
It appears that belief is not usually investigated as a defining concept in sociology. Belief 
has been framed within ―conversion‖ where conversion is ―a change in one‘s universe of 
discourse‖ (Hunt, 2002: 84). Conversion is conceptualised as a change in consciousness, of 
self image, of one‘s meaning system.26 However, I think treating belief as discourse offers 
a stronger model for analysis of the current data. Statements like Kelvin‘s ―I definitely am 
a Christian believer‖ prompted to me consider belief in relation to Foucault‘s ideas about 
knowledge. Knowledge is defined by analytic philosophers as justified true belief (Elder-
Vass, 2012: 209). I think if knowledge can be considered a form of belief, then beliefs 
                                               
26 ―Conversion‖ is not a useful term in my opinion, even though Hunt notes it can be used for long, slow 
changes in behaviour (Hunt, 2002: 84). I prefer to speak of religious ―change‖ or ―adoption‖ as conversion 
has too many connotations of swift dramatic change. 
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must be considered part of the Foucauldian knowledge/power circuit. 
 
While to outsiders the details of religious beliefs may seem inconsequential, to insiders 
beliefs can be extremely important. An indication of the unique role of belief in the 
Christian world may be intimated from Borowitz (quoted in Harrison, 2007: 16) who 
claims ―for the Jew, religion cannot be so easily identified with the affirmation of a given 
content of belief.‖ Christian discourse includes discussion over what exactly is ―belief‖. Is 
belief primarily ―intellectual assent to revealed truths‖, or ―trust in a person‖, or ―a certain 
mode of existence‖? (Lewis and Demarest, 1994: 73). Smith (2005: 216-217) criticises the 
view that Christian belief is a merely a system of belief in propositions. He says these 
attitudes arise from defining belief only as a mental state. On this view: 
 
―a mental state is described as a kind of ‗attitude‘– in particular a ‗propositional 
attitude‘ that is a belief about a state of affairs... One has knowledge only if one‘s 
beliefs are true.‖ 
 
Colin indicated that intellectual beliefs alone were unhelpful: 
 
Colin: 
… otherwise it becomes an abstract faith. [It needs] 
the lived experience perhaps. It has to be more than a 
theory. Otherwise it's just an idea. … It's an 
important crux of what makes a faith rather than a 
theory, something that affects your life rather than 
just a thought. 
 
Smith goes on to suggest in explicitly postmodern terms that belief is also a matter of the 
―heart‖ and of ―interpretation of a text‖. Others point out that belief is not merely 
intellectual assent. ―Simmel explicitly repudiates the mechanistic psychology that views 
religiosity as a mental entity, instead proposing to see it sociologically as ‗a form 
according to which the human soul experiences life and comprehends its existence‘‖ 
(Scaff, 2011: 226). To foreshadow the discussion below, some of these ways of construing 
belief also allow belief to be considered a Foucauldian ―practice‖. 
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 For Foucault, dominant discourses and knowledges maintain their power through an 
ongoing struggle with ―disqualified‖ or ―subjugated‖ knowledges– the knowledge of those 
on the margins (Miller, 2008: 257). By subjugated knowledges, Foucault means ―a whole 
set of knowledges that have been disqualified‖, ―naive knowledges‖, knowledges 
insufficiently scientific, low-ranking knowledges such as those of the psychiatric patient 
(Foucault, 1976b: 82). Foucault suggests that we amplify such subjugated voices, for: 
 
―it is through the reappearance of this knowledge, of these local, popular 
knowledges … that criticism performs its work‖ (Foucault, 1976b: 82). 
 
I suggest that the knowledge gay Christians hold– the knowledge, for example, that one 
can be gay and Christian– is a subjugated knowledge. Foucault is a ―philosopher of 
discontinuity‖; bodies of knowledge (discourses) do not necessarily progress over time in a 
cumulative fashion (McHoul and Grace, 1993: 4). Hence, what gay Christians know can 
be discontiguous with the Christian past. These subjugated knowledges can also be 
expressed in parrhesia (truth telling) and thus contribute to resistance, discussed below. 
 
Belief As Practice.  
A second aspect of belief invites discussion: 
 
Colin: 
I've chosen and believe and use Christ and Jesus as the 
example that I choose, and that is a personal choice 
that I make. 
 
Phrases such as this indicate belief is not merely intellectual assent to doctrine. The 
employment of ―choice‖ and the idea of―using‖ Christ imply an action, to believe. This is 
belief as a volitional experience as opposed to an intellectual one. Hence I suggest that, 
rightly understood, belief can also be a form of ―practice‖. Carrette considers this 
Foucault‘s primary understanding of religious belief, commenting: 
 
―The practices of religion create the ‗truth‘ of ourselves, which… questions the 
prioritisation of ‗belief‘ over ‗practice‘ in the Western conception of religion. In Foucault, 
as I have indicated, ‗belief‘ is a form of ‗practice‘. Religious beliefs order and regulate the 
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embodied subject.‖ (Carrette , 2000: 150). 
 
In an earlier quote, Colin remarked that intellectual beliefs alone were unhelpful and that 
faith needs ―the lived experience‖. He spoke of this kind of belief as leading one to take 
action such as prayer, which I interpret as a practice. Bruce valued his Baptist church for 
its actions around social justice issues. For Bruce, belief should result in practice. For 
similar reasons, Mike felt that the political arena was ―the obvious place for the church to 
be.‖ 
 
Foucault avoided the ―history of beliefs‖. Instead he analysed the ―history of real 
practices‖, a strategy through which he deliberately removed the discussion of Christian 
doctrines in his discussion of Christian technologies of the self (Carrette, 2000: 110). 
Nancy Fraser comments,―Foucault‘s genealogy of modern power establishes that power 
touches people‘s lives more fundamentally through their social practices than through their 
beliefs‖ (quoted in Carrette, 2000: 111). Carrette (2000: 111) acknowledges that seeing 
belief as a practice alone may be problematic: ―There is ... a tension in Foucault‘s later 
work on Christianity when belief and social practice are separated so absolutely, for 
religious belief informs practice.‖ However I think Foucault‘s study of the early Christian 
confessional term exomologesis suggests a combination of belief and practice. 
―Exomologesis as an ‗act of faith‘ is indispensable to the Christian for whom these 
revealed and taught truths are not simply a matter of beliefs that he accepts but also 
obligations through which he commits himself...‖ (Foucault, 1980c: 155). In my view the 
interview data and commentary supports the idea that ―belief‖ is both a discourse of 
knowledge/power and a practice employed by Christians. 
 
 
Truth.  
If we accept that knowledge is ―justified true belief‖ then understanding power/knowledge 
also requires understanding discourses around truth. Part of Harry‘s story illustrates the 
importance of having the right beliefs, or true beliefs. For a number of years he substituted 
a ―house group‖ for his usual church attendance. In that group were two couples who: 
 
had been asked to not come back to the [evangelical] 
church congregation because their theology was suspect. 
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This couple were rejected for being outside the church‘s truth. This illustrates the high 
value Christian discourse places on the idea of truth. Beliefs and knowledge imply a 
relationship with truth. Truth is therefore also related to power: 
 
―Truth isn‘t outside power, or lacking in power... Truth is a thing of this world: it is 
produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint‖ 
(Foucault: 1984d: 72). 
 
The subject creates itself through practices which are ―games of truth‖ (Foucault: 1984e: 
440). ―Each society,‖– and, I suggest, each church– ―has its regime of truth‖ (Foucault: 
1984d: 73). A regime of truth includes: 
 
―the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true‖ (Foucault: 1984d: 73). 
 
Here Foucault suggests that truth is relative to a particular location, a religious group or 
church perhaps. Although we may feel otherwise, truth is not universal, but functions 
within the discourses and mechanisms of a church. Those who have status, church leaders 
for example, say what counts as true. As far as mainstream Christian discourse is 
concerned, the things which gay Christians know cannot be truths. This is linked with 
subjugated knowledge, discussed above. 
 
If this is so, how can truth change and new truths become part of accepted discourse? 
Foucault does acknowledge that truth can be contested, ―it is the issue of a whole political 
debate and social confrontation (‗ideological‘ struggles)‖ (Foucault: 1984d: 73). However, 
this ―battle for truth‖ is not centred around discovering absolute truths, but rather around 
which rules in which truth game are ascendant (Foucault: 1984d: 74). 
 
In summary, religious belief as truth and a form of knowledge always carries power 
relations alongside it. Merely by espousing beliefs in God, and in Christian discourses the 
men in this study embody power. This religious power is considered in the next section. 
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6.2 Religion and Productive Power Relations 
 
―Religion is a sphere of force relations in the wider cultural network– it inescapably exists 
as a manifestation of power‖ (Carrette, 2000: 148). In the epigram quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter Foucault states that the even the ―soul‖ is produced by power (DP: 29) 27. 
Drawing on Foucault, Geroulanos (2006: 637) believes power can be religious in three 
ways: 
 
―1. Certain kinds of power are strictly religious (e.g., Christian pastoral power and 
its development into a socio-political force). 
2. Within a certain group or society, power can be inflected religiously (e.g., in the 
addition of a church to a panoptic factory). 
3. Power, in modernity, may have a fundamentally religious basis.‖ 
 
Specific power-talk around Christian pastoral power is demonstrated in one of the 
interviews where Dave refers to the power which (theological) knowledge gave him: 
 
One big [factor] is that I did four years of 
theological study, and knew that... I wasn't going to 
let any minister tell me what was right or wrong, you 
know? I didn't give them that kind of power. 
 
Dave adds: 
 
Walter Wink talks about institutions becoming bigger 
and more powerful than they first start out to be. And 
I think he drew me to that, to look at them with a 
great deal of care and suspicion. Because they, they 
take over. … He gave me a bit of a head's up, a red 
flag about institutions. 
 
                                               
27
 Foucault‘s ideas about an incorporeal soul are curious. It is not certain he merely used the word ―soul‖ as a 
metaphor for the human being as he rejects the idea that the soul is an illusion and insists that it has a reality. 
He devotes a chapter of The Care of the Self to ―The work of the soul.‖ 
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Wink (1984: 7), a theologian, argues that, ―The language of power pervades the whole 
New Testament‖. Hence power may specifically affect Christians through Biblical texts 
and the discourses Christians make utilising them. In some ways it is no surprise when 
power relations are discovered as, ―anyone who goes looking for power will find it‖ 
(Spickard, 2007:134). Some argue that Foucault reduces all explanations of social 
behaviour to interactions of power and neglects other possibilities. Against this, King 
argues that Foucault‘s view is not reductionist, it is merely a ―lens‖. As he writes, looking 
for power-knowledge is: 
 
―a lens for examining a particular dimension of the sociocultural dynamic and in no 
sense to be taken as a definitive or all-encompassing position that reduces 
everything to power relations‖ (King, 1999: 208). 
 
The lens of power relations has been useful in examining the current data. Returning to the 
interviews, Dave explains his conception of power: 
 
It’s a process of giving … an individual power, or 
another word to use, a term, is self-actualisation. … I 
think that’s what I’m talking about. Self-
actualization. Power is just a quicker, easier way of 
saying that. 
 
This seems a clear example of self-empowerment. Affirming one‘s homosexuality in the 
face of opposition requires a ―personal strength‖ (Lalich and McLaren, 2010: 1304). Yip 
(1997: 108) also affirms the ―power of personal experience‖ in gay Christian lives, which I 
connect to the construction of a religious self in chapter seven. Agamben (1996: 113) 
comments that the goal of a ―happy life‖28 in the ―coming community‖ should be a life 
―that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its own communicability– a life 
over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold.‖ I think that finding one‘s own 
power means that for gay Christians sovereign church politics can no longer have any 
hold. In terms of state politics, New Zealand homosexual law reform decriminalised the 
private lives of homosexuals in 1986. Pritchard (2005: 80) comments, ―for Foucault, the 
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 Agamben also uses the term ―form-of-life‖. 
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removal of the state from private lives did not liberate sexuality from the effects of power; 
power was already present in the defining of identity, feelings, and acts as ‗normal‘ or 
‗deviant‘.‖ 
 
Foucault (1983a) is clear that power relations are not always to be analysed in terms of 
dominance, power can be ―productive‖. In this section I emphasise the productive side of 
power. The oppressive side of power in churches is developed under the theme of 
―exclusion‖ in chapter five. As discussed above, beliefs carry knowledge and therefore 
power. Discourses concerning the Bible and its interpretation structure Christian lives. 
Adam commented that in recent years he had studied: 
 
what the Bible actually says about [homosexuality]. I 
discovered a lot of very interesting things [laughs] 
and it was not quite as I thought. … Finally for the 
first time in my life I actually like myself and am 
comfortable with who I am. 
 
While the Bible has been used to disempower gay men, in this case Adam‘s beliefs around 
the Bible carried potency (knowledge/power). Adam was separately asked what 
empowered him. He replied: 
 
Understanding the message of radical grace is what 
really empowered me more than anything else. 
 
He explained ―radical grace‖ as: 
 
Jesus has done it, he's done everything. There's 
nothing more I can possibly do to earn any more favour 
or any more love, it's just done. 
 
I think that for Adam, this ―message‖ (doctrine, belief) embodied power/knowledge. When 
asked about power, Colin stated that he saw God strengthening him, and that he meets God 
in nature: 
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Colin: 
Life, God, you know I can connect directly with that. I 
can surpass church, and that gives me strength, that 
gives me what I need. That gives me the empowerment to 
believe and to live my life, and feel fulfilled and to 
have faith. 
… 
I suppose I do see [God] as powerful. It’s not a word I 
would normally use. … “Powerful” I guess is close, but 
it’s not big enough for what I imagine God to be. 
 
Colin also talked about God‘s power as the idea that God is in benevolent control of the 
world. He acknowledged God is ―a powerful force‖, but that we don‘t need to worry or ask 
for help ―cos God‘s actually got it in control anyway.‖ 
 
 
God as a Positive Power. 
Drawing on Alfred Shutz‘s distinction between direct face-to-face interaction and indirect 
action with others, Turner (2008: 34) writes, ―In sociology it is perfectly reasonable to 
include in ‗interaction‘, exchanges... between the faithful and their gods.‖ I think it is 
useful to explore the notion of God as a power in Foucauldian terms. When analysing the 
theme of support (chapter five) I was curious that the support of God was not often 
mentioned explicitly. However, a view of the divine as empowering and therefore 
supportive could frequently be seen in the way interviewees talked about God. I have 
already discussed Colin‘s view of God‘s empowerment, above. Trevor spoke of power in 
terms of God causing events in our lives: 
 
Trevor: 
Either God causes things to happen in our lives or he 
allows things to happen in our lives and either way … 
maybe I should [just accept this]. 
 
In context, the idea of accepting God as a power was spoken of as a positive thing. It 
seemed for Trevor that reframing thoughts about God also helped him in being 
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comfortable with himself as a gay Christian. Scott commented: 
 
I think I understand the power of God as my own power, 
really. … And I understand the power of God is when I 
am in tune with my Self. 
 
Scott appeared to link the power of God with self-power. When asked if he had any 
thoughts on God as a power in his life. Edward replied: 
 
Edward: 
Yes. God is with me all the time. And I believe God 
gives us strength to do what he wants us to do. And I 
acknowledge the fact that God is the source of all 
power and all strength … You know, I believe I was 
created gay by God. [It's] not by accident, we're made 
that way. 
 
In an earlier discussion about empowerment Edward said: 
 
I've always believed that if we have a faith in God, 
God is there when we need him. 
 
―God is there when we need him‖ implies God has power to influence one‘s life. The 
above interview fragments seem indications that God can be a productive power. 
 
 
Theoscopy.  
Linked to the idea of God as a power is ―theoscopy‖, the sense of being seen by God. The 
term is developed by Geroulanos (2006) who makes particular use of Foucault‘s 
panopticism and of Guy Debord‘s Society of the Spectacle.29 Theoscopy ―is to live a 
paranoid experience of nakedness before a God who is all-seeing, hence omniscient and 
omnimpotent, and who accordingly metes out a social experience and a knowledge of 
                                               
29
 Foucault rejects Debord‘s ideas in Discipline and Punish (p. 217), writing ―Our society is not one of 
spectacle, but of surveillance‖. 
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oneself and one‘s history that is based on this emphasis of being seen‖ (Geroulanos, 2006: 
633). It is likely that believers act as if a panoptic God is there, although perhaps 
Geroulanos is stretching Foucault a bit far. However, I did not find this idea resonated with 
what was said in the interviews. For example: 
 
Trevor: 
I like the idea of God watching our lives. Say you have 
a kid that's growing up, you watch how they do … You 
watch their life because you're interested in their 
life. But you don't step in and try and control it or 
do a whole lot of stuff, you know? And I kinda think 
that's how God is with us. 
 
Trevor felt God watching us was a productive power relation, not a ―paranoid experience‖. 
We should be careful not to assume God‘s observation of us is negative. As above, the idea 
of God as power-over can also be considered outside the discourse of surveillance. God as 
power-over implies transcendence but this is not the only way to conceive of the divine. 
While the analysis of deity as a sovereign power is certainly interesting, there are other 
possibilities. God could also be power-in or power-through, in the sense of the immanence 
discussed by Agamben, Deleuze and Spinoza. In The Weakness of God Caputo (2006: 23) 
postulates a ―God without sovereignty‖. I mention these ideas to illustrate that a 
dominating power-centric view of God is not the only possible view. 
 
This section has discussed personal empowerment and also participants‘ experience of God 
as productive rather than dominating, power-in rather than power-over. Where 
interviewees had been excluded by churches (dominating power) they made a distinction 
between the action of people and the action of God. 
 
 
6.3 Resistance 
 
Monique Wittig (1992, p. xiii) describes heterosexuality not as an institution, but as a 
political regime which rests on the submission and the appropriation of women. Borrowing 
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from Wittig, the heterosexual church supports this political regime which dominates– 
requires submission from– homosexuals. However, Wittig emphasises domination, which 
was only part of Foucault‘s relations of power. Resistance to pastoral power is embodied 
by many gay Christians: 
 
Dave: 
I wasn't going to let any minister tell me what was 
right or wrong, you know? I didn't give them that kind 
of power. 
 
Foucault says there are no relations of power without resistances and that studying 
resistance is a useful starting point towards studying power (Foucault, 1980b: 141; 1982a: 
780). Mansbridge (2001: 4) believes Foucault mainly stresses the effects of power rather 
than the creation of resistance. Alternatively, Nealon (2008:111) thinks Foucault attaches 
great importance to resistance but says we must avoid the binary of resistance versus 
power. 
 
Carrette (2000: 142) believes that most of Foucault‘s writing on religion was a negative 
critique. In his discussion Carrette (2004: 218) describes monotheism as a ―system of 
thought which attempts to obliterate the possibility of difference and diversity.‖ The 
experiences of many of the interviewees seem to offer resistance to such a discourse of 
―normalisation.‖ Their mere presence in Christian churches adds difference and diversity. I 
propose that gay Christians who remain in the church embody resistance to this 
―obliteration of difference‖. In fact they embody a dual resistance, both within the Church 
and within the non-Christian gay community as well. Bruce commented on this: 
 
Bruce: 
I have to say, being a Christian in gay circles is 
quite hard. Because [I have gay friends] but they’re 
hugely anti-church. 
 
However the men interviewed here do not demonstrate a general resistance to all things 
religious so it is important to ask what they are resisting. It appears that those interviewed 
were often resisting religious organisations or leadership– the ―non-discursive form‖ of the 
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church. Those studied also resisted certain discourses, for example the discourse that gays 
are inherently sinful. However, these men are not resisting God, nor even all aspects of the 
Church. Colin, for example, spoke of God‘s love: 
 
Colin: 
We have to believe that God loves us and will do his 
best for us. 
 
Adam also summed up his views in terms of love, 
 
Adam: 
For me, God is love. That's it. Beginning and end of 
story. Everything else is just sort of interpretation 
on that, and how you might apply that. 
 
Thus, the interviewees were clear that it was either God, or their Christian faith, or 
Christian values that they were responding warmly to, even if organisationally they did not 
agree with all that was going on. As an aside, I think there is a connection between love 
and power, but I am as yet unsure of how to frame this. Perhaps, in simple terms, the love 
of God is empowering for believers. If a power-love connection is valid, Foucault did not 
raise the idea. 
 
However, if resistance is as ubiquitous and effective as dominating power, what can be 
made of the negative experiences of the men in this study? For example, Harry, afraid to 
come out lest he lose his job in a church organisation. Or John, who lost his position in 
various evangelical institutions when he came out. The experiences of those who appear to 
have been pressed down by power seem to question the efficacy of (this reading of) 
Foucault‘s resistance alone. While I think the empowerment of resistance is a valid 
interpretation of the current data, caution is needed. Resistance should not be over-
emphasised against these mens‘ experience of dominating power in their churches. 
Parrhesia, described in the next section, also supports resistance. 
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6.4 Parrhesia, Speaking Out 
 
In 1983 Foucault conducted a lecture series at Berkeley where he discussed ancient 
Christian use of the Greek term parrhesia (Bernauer, 2004). Parrhesia can be translated ―to 
speak boldly‖. Freedom of speech is implied, in particular the obligation to speak the truth 
for the common good, even at personal risk. Foucault conceived parrhesia as a mode of 
discourse where one speaks openly and truthfully without the use of manipulation or 
rhetoric (Foucault. 1983b). Parrhesia conflicts with our Cartesian model of truth according 
to Foucault; Descartes saw ―truth‖ as what is undeniable. For Descartes we must doubt 
everything that can be doubted, thus, speech that is not examined or criticized may not 
have a valid relation to truth. 
 
There is always an element of personal danger in speaking boldly; as Foucault (1983b) 
says, ―the parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk‖. For Foucault, a user of parrhesia 
must be in a less empowered social position than those to whom they are revealing their 
truth. For instance, a congregation member speaking the truth to a priest would be an 
example of parrhesia, whereas a priest revealing the truth to his congregation would not. 
Foucault concludes: 
 
―To summarize the foregoing, parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the 
speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to 
his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people 
through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation 
to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal 
activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his 
life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people 
(as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses 
frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of 
death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty 
instead of self-interest and moral apathy‖ (Foucault, 1983b). 
 
The usefulness of such a concept for gay Christians speaking their truth to those 
embodying greater power in the Church seems clear. Participants indicated some situations 
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where it could be argued parrhesia was taking place. When he came out, John was asked to 
stand down from leadership in several Christian organisations. He commented that it was 
―generally done in a generous and good spirit‖, but in one case John came into conflict 
with the principal of the institution. John said, ―as far as he was concerned I was 
challenging his authority.‖ Furthermore: 
 
John: 
It is very, very clear that only churches, not 
charitable organisations can exclude people on the 
basis of their sexual orientation and I could have 
taken [the organisation] to the Human Rights Commission 
because I had a contract … and I made it clear that, 
“You realise that I could legitimately take you to the 
Human Rights Commission because you're quite clearly 
breaching employment conditions”. 
 
Another interviewee, Scott spoke out in a similar way. When in conflict with his Christian 
employers it was only when Scott threatened to involve the Human Rights Commission 
that those in power backed down. John‘s and Scott‘s responses could be seen as a speaking 
of the truth boldly at personal risk. Parrhesia also ties in with Foucault‘s concept of 
―resistance‖, discussed above. 
 
Parrhesia could be compared with Foucault‘s extensive consideration of Catholic 
confession in his later work (Hepworth and Turner, 1982; HS3). I agree with Bernauer 
(2004: 81) that confession is about ―truth obligations‖, but confession is only of sins, of 
negative sides of oneself. A statement such as Edward‘s ―I believe I was created gay by 
God‖ would not be considered confession. None of the men interviewed spoke of being 
gay in terms of confession, thus parrhesia seems a better fit. To give another example of 
parrhesia, Trevor had coffee with one of his pastors and candidly discussed his church‘s 
negative focus on the parliamentary Marriage Amendment Act (2013). He commented: 
 
Trevor: 
If you feel like you have to be silent about where 
you're at, you always feel a bit on the outside. If you 
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can't be open about where you're at. 
 … 
How can you be part of a community if you can't say 
where you're at? 
 
Trevor wanted to be able to ―say where he was at‖. ―Coming out‖, a common phrase in 
gay writing, is about not being silent, about speaking. It is ―telling yourself‖ (coming out 
to yourself) and ―telling others‖ (Outland 2000:1). I suggest coming out is a discourse in 
itself, a ‗what can be said‘ moment. Telling the truth about ourselves, public confession– 
forms of coming out– are themes in Foucault‘s The Hermeneutics of the Self (1980a). 
Foucault writes that if sex is not talked about, ―then the mere fact that one is speaking 
about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such 
language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power, he upsets 
established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom.‖ (HS1: 6) In these terms, by 
speaking the men studied here are putting themselves outside of power. 
 
Foucault continues: 
 
―What sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in terms of repression is doubtless this 
opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise 
bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation and manifold pleasures; to 
pronounce a discourse that combines the fervour of knowledge, the determination 
to change the laws… ‖ (HS1: 7). 
 
Des Smith, speaking of the New Zealand Homosexual Law Reform Bill (1986), says, ―One 
thing we learned was how important visibility is. A lot of people would like us to go away, 
but [being visible] is part of our survival‖ (Rothwell, 2011: A7). In a very real sense, this 
gay ―visibility‖ can be compared with speaking out (parrhesia). 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed belief as a container of knowledge, and various 
forms of religious power. It has only obliquely discussed the power of church leadership 
(Foucault‘s ―pastoral power‖), and the dominating power of the Church as an institution. 
Instead, it has concentrated on ―productive powers‖ such as resistance and parrhesia in 
supporting the theme of Belief as Knowledge-Power.
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7 
The Care of the Christian Self 
 
 
“By spirituality, I understand that which precisely refers to a subject acceding to a 
certain mode of being and to the transformations which the subject must make of 
himself in order to accede to this mode of being.” 
(Foucault, 1984e: 443) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I explore how a religious ethics of the self might look by analysing The Self 
Construction of the Christian Subject and The Practice of Churchgoing. The first sub-
theme was developed by considering Foucault‘s care of the self, the second derives from 
the motivating question behind this study, the question of why gay Christians go to church. 
 
 
7.1 The Self-Construction of the Christian Subject 
 
In the epigram above, spirituality is a ―mode of being‖ which is achieved by 
transformations carried out on oneself. These transformations are described as ―techniques 
of the self‖ or ―self forming acts‖ and are usually associated with Foucault‘s (HS2, HS3) 
study of the pre-Christian Greek ethics of the self. However, in his last years Foucault also 
studied another way of being, another discursive formation, another set of self-forming 
techniques. This subject can be found from approximately 1980 in his lectures and 
interviews, for example in About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self (Foucault, 
1980a), but also to some degree in his published work. I evaluate these Christian ethics of 
the code here in relation to the interview data. 
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The Codified Self.  
In the final paragraph of The Care of The Self Foucault describes: 
 
―a mode of subjection in the form of obedience to a general law; ... a type of work 
on oneself that implies a decipherment of the soul; ... and a mode of ethical 
fulfilment that tends toward self-renunciation‖ (HS3: 239,240). 
 
These are features he associates with ancient Christian confession and penance, which was 
the religious technology Foucault studied most (Bernauer, 2005: 562). In his discussion of 
confession Foucault (1982b: 196) indicates that subjectification comes about as Christians 
tell the truth about themselves. 
 
It might appear that Foucault‘s view of the ancient Christian subject would be highly 
applicable to this study. Yet the concepts of obedience and self-renunciation did not seem 
relevant at all for those interviewed. However, it is important to note that self-renunciation 
may be relevant for the interviewee, but not in terms of the research questions I posed in 
this study. It is possible, for example, that certain practices such as kneeling for prayer 
might be considered to express obedience. 
 
At the surface level of ―plain language‖ themes of obedience did not emerge from the data 
so I considered possible associations with obedience. For example, in chapter five Trevor 
spoke of wanting to ―honour God‖ and I wondered whether honour could be related to 
obedience. However, the tenor of what Trevor said in the rest of his interview did not 
really seem to fit with obedience. I have previously raised interviewees‘ practice of 
changing churches and their disagreements with church authorities. Mike, for example, 
declared, ―I distrust the institution enormously.‖ I see these as other examples of non-
obedience to religious authority. Furthermore, the discussion in chapter six about God and 
power indicates participants preferred to render obedience to God rather than to people or 
an organisation. This may be a subtle point, but it is different to Foucault‘s view of 
obedience to (human) religious authority. In practice, however, obedience to God may 
have similar self-forming effects in the life of a believer. Adam was asked specifically 
whether the concept of obedience was relevant to him: 
 
Chapter 7 
 
92 
 
Adam: 
Obedience isn't quite the right word. … [In relation to 
God] you do things just because it's a love 
relationship. The concept of obedience doesn't enter 
into a love relationship. And it's the same with 
people. In the church, I'm not into obedience to the 
leaders in the church. It's relationship, you respect 
each other. 
 
Scott was also asked if obedience was relevant and replied: 
 
Scott: 
No, not at all. 
 
If there is any obedience it's to my Self [Scott's term 
for God] and to that sense of integrity that brings. 
But I don't hold to obedience to a Bishop or to an 
institution. … It's more a question of having integrity 
in my life rather than obedience. 
 
These are clear rejections of obedience in favour of other forms of relation. I want to 
consider why obedience and self-renunciation did not seem relevant for the participants by 
exploring Foucault‘s work on Christianity in more depth. For Foucault the ultimate aim of 
Christian ascetics was the renunciation of the self and detachment from the world– not the 
Greek preparation of the self for social and political obligations (Macmillan, 2011: 12). In 
ancient Christianity self-renunciation was to be understood as a technique of the self. The 
defining features of this renunciation were obedience and contemplation. The supreme 
good was not the mastery of oneself, but the contemplation of God (Foucault, 1980a: 175). 
Thus, obedience was not limited to actions but included thoughts. 
 
There was also a move to law and authority which meant that what was important was not 
being a truthful subject, but the content of a truthful statement. The Christian experience 
thus brought in a new relation between truth and subjectivation. Now truth did not involve 
a subject‘s being, as did the previous ethics of the self. The truth about the subject must 
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now follow the general rules of objective truth-production. To summarise Foucault‘s ethics 
of the code: 
 
―The free autonomous subject disappears and becomes the passive agent of a 
universal rule. The main question no longer concerns the ways one can become a 
subject of truth, but how one becomes an object of self-knowledge. The 
constitution of the subject as an object of true discourse in Western culture is at the 
expense of the Antique figure of the ethical subject of truth‖ (Macmillan, 2011: 15). 
 
This view of religion is not new in Foucault, in Madness and Civilisation he speaks of 
religion as ―a constant principle of coercion. It is both spontaneity and constraint...‖ (MC: 
244). It may be that Foucault would have developed other views, as in his final lecture at 
the Collège de France he distinguishes two poles in Christian development. The first pole 
stresses the self examination and fearful obedience to God already described, the second 
pole sees parrhesia as representing the mystical tradition from which our culture developed 
a critical attitude (Bernauer, 2005: 568). Thus, Foucault may have also distinguished an 
element of critical mysticism in the Christian self. 
 
I think parts of a few participants‘ spirituality could be called mystical, although Bruce 
specifically rejected the idea: 
 
Bruce: 
I’m definitely not a mystic. I’m too practical. 
 
Scott, in particular, called himself a mystic at one point, although his preferred term was 
―contemplative‖. So mysticism may have some relevance for contemporary Christians, 
although it is unclear how Foucault would have developed this idea further. Foucault 
insisted that his shift to techniques of the self was only a different way to consider our 
present, although Christian and modern culture are not coextensive (Macmillan, 2011: 5). 
Foucault (1980a: 169) comments, ―the modern hermeneutics of the self is rooted much 
more in … Christian techniques than in the Classical ones.‖ 
 
So then, why was obedience irrelevant for the men studied? I suggest it is mainly because 
Foucault focused on ―the first centuries of Christianity‖ (HS2: 12) not on recent 
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developments. Since that time other discourses and practices may have been incorporated 
in the Christian apparatus, for example, the changes associated with Protestantism. In this 
study no Roman Catholic or Orthodox Christians were interviewed. Confession to a 
pastoral authority, the main practice by which Foucault interpreted the Christian self, is 
largely unknown to Protestants. It is also worth noting that Foucault specifically analyses 
―prescriptive‖ texts written for the purpose of offering rules and advice on behaviour 
(HS2: 12). It is possible that this approach may limit him to finding only what he is 
looking for– rules. 
 
Foucault does appear to acknowledge that religion can change. Macmillan (2011: 22) 
footnotes, ―Foucault‘s assessment of Christian techniques of the self in no way 
presupposes a monolithic and unchanging model.‖ 30 In HS2 (29-30) Foucault at first says, 
―it would be quite incorrect to reduce... Christian moralities to such a model‖ of 
submission to laws. ―And yet‖, he continues, ―it may not be wrong‖ to think that the 
penitential system brought about ―a very strong ‗codification‘ of the moral experience. It 
was against this codification that many spiritual movements reacted before the 
Reformation.‖ Foucault seems to be ambivalent in this passage– are Christian moralities 
reduced to submission to laws or not? Foucault is unclear. Foucault also acknowledges 
(HS2: 30) that the Greek style of ―ethics-oriented moralities... have been very important in 
Christianity, functioning alongside the ‗code-oriented‘ moralities.‖ He later writes that both 
approaches to morality could coexist, that we should neglect: 
 
―neither their coexistence, their interrelations, their relative autonomy, nor their 
possible differences of emphasis‖ (HS2: 31). 
 
It seems that in his studies Foucault is looking for overall tendencies: 
 
―moral conceptions in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity were much more oriented 
towards practices of the self and the question of askēsis than toward codifications 
of conducts and the strict definition of what is permitted and what is forbidden‖ 
(HS2: 30, emphasis mine). 
                                               
30
  Yet Macmillan seems to downplay this statement. Macmillan (2011: 21) also thinks that Foucault‘s 
techniques of the self are intended to champion the Enlightenment values of freedom and autonomy. 
However I would suggest Foucault was consistently ambivalent, and even hostile toward enlightenment 
humanism. 
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On a personal level Miller (1993: 358) says Foucault struggled against ―pastoral power‖ 
and the requirement to confess, to tell the truth about oneself to another. 
 
In summary, Foucault‘s view of ancient Christian practices was not useful for high modern 
Christians like those interviewed in this study, as it does not adequately describe their 
experience. Yet, as shown, Foucault acknowledged that Christian experience can include 
ideas from other discourses such as the older Greco-Roman field. The experiences of the 
men in this study support this inclusion of other ideas. 
 
 
Doing the Right Thing: Discourses of Morality. 
There is one aspect of Foucault‘s ethics of the code that did seem relevant for the data. As 
previously discussed, Foucault (HS2: 30) suggests there are two kinds of morality, code-
based and ethics-based. In the first, the main emphasis is placed on the code and its 
associated laws and punishments. In the second, the practice of the self is what matters. He 
is quite clear that even ancient Christianity incorporated both types of morality: 
 
―It would be quite incorrect to reduce Christian morality… to such a [code-based] 
model. … ‗Ethics-oriented‘ moralities… have been very important in Christianity‖ 
(HS2: 30). 
 
―The experience associated with the Roman Catholic Church is a juridico-moral 
codification of actions‖, according to Macmillan (2011: 13). Hence law– or the code– 
became a general principle for ordering human affairs in early Christianity. I think 
Christianity still has a discourse of being moral, being a ―good‖ Christian, which is 
supported by the data. This discourse requires that one follow the prescribed expressions 
of sexuality, and eschew those which are proscribed. Edward, within his discussion of 
power, moved directly on to discuss morality: 
 
I believe God laid down principles, and as long as we 
keep within those principles we're doing the right 
thing. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
96 
 
Trevor highlighted church thinking around a right/wrong duality: 
 
Trevor: 
I think everything about being gay is probably seen as 
wrong in the church, you know? Whereas I don't think it 
all is. 
 
That focus on doing the right thing, on principles is, I think, a major discourse within 
Christianity. Thinking of oneself as immoral is disempowering, thinking of oneself as 
―doing the right thing‖ and ―being in God‘s will‖ is empowering. 
 
―In the minds of our contemporaries,‖ comments Jacques Ellul (1986: 69), ―Christianity 
primarily means morality. The spiritual aspect is forgotten, except among a few.‖ Ellul 
argues that in the discourses of everyday life, to be Christian is to be moral, rather than 
spiritual. This may also imply that there is only one valid (Christian) morality. Following 
Foucault‘s discussion of a code-based ethic, it seems likely that this popular discourse 
around morality originated from Christian influence on Western cultures. This is perhaps 
particularly the case around sexual morality. Press reports generally identify a conservative 
sex ethic with a Christian ethic (Mol, 1985: 146). Sexual behaviours are considered to be 
part of the ethical realm, which Foucault himself notes may not always have been the case 
(HS2: 25 - 32). Ellul (1986: 88) believes, ―The church‘s reaction to the encounter with 
immorality [is an] immense attempt to enforce law and morality‖, which evokes notions of 
disciplinary power. 
 
However, as the Christian apparatus can incorporate more than one style of morality (HS2: 
30), it appears gay Christians may follow the ethical path rather than the code-based path. 
The code-based path would require obedience to laws (homosexuality is wrong) whereas 
the ethics-based path elevates seeking one‘s own moral growth above all else. By resisting 
this code these men are altering the discourse, perhaps from the ―homosexuality is wrong‖ 
of conservative church ―law‖ to ―homosexuality is good‖: 
 
Edward: 
I believe I was created gay by God. 
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Being created by God implies inherent goodness, as God can only create good. At one 
point Kelvin stated that he lived ―a moral life.‖ However, discourses about morality may 
also move beyond a binary good/bad dyad. For example, Adam explained that he had 
previously seen his homosexuality as wrong, but that his position had changed: 
 
Adam: 
Until a couple years ago it was always a battle, it was 
wrong, I can't be gay. 
… 
My key position now is relationship is everything. And 
I don't even think in terms of what's right or wrong, 
but what comes from love. [Nothing else,] just “what is 
love?” 
 
Pentecostalism ―opposes moral permissiveness‖ according to Black (1991: 116, 117). 
Adam attends a conservative Pentecostal church, yet does not ―even think in terms of 
what‘s right or wrong‖. I think this excerpt demonstrates two things. Firstly, it shows the 
underlying pervasiveness of code-based morality– the implication from Adam‘s statement 
is that a right/wrong discourse is assumed. Secondly however, Adam‘s story also 
demonstrates that, while significant, a code-based (good/bad) morality may not control 
every modern Christian. 
 
 
The Ethical Self. 
 In Foucault‘s better-known analysis, pre-Christian Greek spirituality is formed from 
techniques which are focused on the self. Foucault (1971: 139) writes: 
 
―Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for 
experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge.‖ 
 
Foucault presents this experimentation on ourselves as a form of asceticism (askēsis) 
because by choosing certain acts we cut off some possible ways of acting in favour of 
serving another end (HS2: 72-77). Foucault is concerned with ―the games of truth in the 
relationship of the self with the self and the forming of oneself as a subject‖ (HS2 : 6). 
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In relating these concepts to the interview data, it must be remembered that Foucault is 
discussing ancient selves whereas the subjects of this study are modern selves, influenced 
by centuries of other discourse. Foucault does allow that the classical concept of the care 
of the self can be updated to modern thought, but emphasises this would be something 
new, not merely a repetition of the old (Foucault, 1984e: 443-4). Thus I suggest that the 
modern Christian subject is ―new‖, but at least partially incorporates the Greco-Roman 
focus on self-transformation. The data did reveal an overall sense of the participants 
transforming themselves, demonstrated by changes in their lives, attitudes and beliefs. For 
example, in the previous chapter I introduced Scott‘s description of God as part of his self: 
 
Scott: 
I think I understand the power of God as my own power, 
really. … I think there is a Self, with a capital “S”, 
which I would say is the divine, and a small “s” which 
is my ego. And I understand the power of God is when I 
am in tune with my Self, with its capital S. 
 
Here Scott appeared to evoke the novel idea of God being used as a self-forming 
technique. This suggests the idea that the Christian care of the self involves other persons; 
a Christian care of the self includes a relation to an Other, that is to other Christians, and 
even to God. In fact, Foucault‘s antique care of the self also includes care for others 
(Foucault, 1984e: 438). A number of the participants spoke of the importance of fellowship 
or community in their lives, and of their relation to God (see chapters five and six). John 
discussed the centrality of his faith to his framing of his self: 
 
John: 
So, central to my own notion of who I am, of my value 
and values, of my purpose, and kind of framing of my 
self … was very much a notion of my faith. 
 
Faith and self are clearly interlinked here. Faith, understood here as belief, is both a 
discourse and a practice which mould the Christian subject. 
 
One point of interest concerns the idea of the self as a unified psyche. As discussed in 
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chapter three, Foucault says we can have multiple forms of the subject which have 
―relationships and interferences‖ between them (Foucault, 1984e: 440). But Foucault does 
not require these selves to be unified; he allows for a more fragmented view of the self. On 
this view, we could consider that the subjects of this study have ―relationships and 
interferences‖ between a homosexual self and a Christian self. These are ways of thinking 
that are only partially reflected in the participants self-view. For example, Harry spoke of 
integrating his gay and Christian sides: 
 
Harry: 
What I’ve been able to do to some degree … is put 
myself as a gay person on this side, as a Christian 
person on this side, see them as two halves. How 
successfully I’ve integrated those I don’t know. 
 
However, specific questions about a unified self were not asked in the interviews and the 
participants all appeared to describe a coherent and unified self. The next section considers 
specific techniques of the Christian self. 
 
Techniques.  
Self-forming acts or techniques are the means by which we change ourselves, our 
practices. From the data a number of activities could be discerned which can be understood 
as techniques to develop oneself: Support group meetings, use of the Bible, attendance at 
church services, involvement in social activism and even prayer could be seen as ―care of 
the self‖. Some of these practices are only briefly touched on; they would reward further 
study. 
 
Concerning prayer, Kelvin said: 
 
I mean obviously I pray, and I have a once a month 
meeting. We have a gay Christian group which is a once 
a month meeting … and it’s open to any people who have 
an interest in gay and Christian issues. 
 
 ―Obviously I pray‖ implies the centrality of prayer as a Christian technique. Harry agreed 
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that ―the intimate or personal nature of the prayer‖ in his gay congregation was quite 
special for him. Perhaps, apart from church attendance, prayer could be considered a 
defining practice for Christians. There are numerous manuals describing techniques, rules, 
habits, guidelines, methodologies, disciplines of prayer (for example, the 17
th
 Century 
Practice of The Presence of God). In a similar fashion to Foucault‘s study of confession, I 
think techniques of prayer and the type of self they engender would provide a rich resource 
for further research. 
 
Kelvin also mentions support group meetings, which might be considered a technique for 
self-development. The value of support and fellowship has been considered in chapter five. 
For some, the idea of serving others could be seen as a technique of the self. For example, 
Bruce highly valued practical tasks such as cooking at youth camps, and valued 
involvement in social justice issues in general. 
 
The Bible has been an important document/discourse for Christians and for any Christian 
homosexual, the Biblical discourses are one challenge that must be negotiated. Although 
the interpretation of the Bible is also likely to belong to discourses of belief (chapter six), 
the way it is used may also be analysed as a practice. Edward valued ―expository 
preaching‖, a type of sermon centred on an in-depth study of the Bible: 
 
Edward: 
With [Independent Evangelical Church] I go there to get 
the continuing expository preaching of God’s word. … I 
go there because I receive spiritual food. 
 
For some Christians there is a sense of submission to scripture which invites analysis in 
terms of Foucault‘s ―disciplinary‖ ideas. Interviewees‘ relationship with the Bible was not 
explicitly investigated in the research questions although a number of the men mentioned it 
in the context of their interviews. Christian use of the Bible as a technique of the self 
would be a profitable direction for future study. 
 
In an intriguing phrase, Mike considered he ―used‖ the church, which evokes the idea of a 
―practice‖: 
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Mike: 
Why do I stay [in the church]? I kind of don’t in a 
way. I use it. 
 
The exact form of his ―use‖ was not elaborated on. If he was ―using‖ church in an 
instrumental sense then it could be argued that all of the men interviewed were ―using‖ the 
church to achieve certain aims and values in their lives. The important practice/technique 
of Church attendance is discussed in detail below. Before this, I consider the practice of 
naming ourselves. 
 
Our selfhood (or subjectivity) is ―understood in terms of the positions within … discourses 
that are available to us‖ (Burr, 2005: 169). Names or labels describe these discursive 
positions. I suggest that for the interview subjects even calling themselves a ―gay 
Christian‖ signifies more than mere words. Hacking (1995, 2006) says that naming 
ourselves creates who we are. In turn, who we are recursively reflects back on how we 
name ourselves. Hacking terms this the ―looping effect‖ of classifications. In similar vein 
Moon (2005: 554) writes, ―Much contemporary theorizing of sexuality shows how 
language works performatively to produce certain kinds of people while rendering other 
ways of being unthinkable, or in [Judith] Butler‘s terms, abject‖. Thus, a discourse which 
can speak the words ―gay Christian‖ brings a new kind of person into existence. However, 
some of the men commented on the limiting nature of names and categories. For example: 
 
Trevor: 
In some ways the categories, you know, gay and straight 
and all this sort of stuff, they're limiting 
categories. I like to think possibly it's more of a 
continuum, people are a bit of a mix sometimes. Some 
people down more one end and some down more the other 
end. 
 
John comments: 
 
John: 
There's quite an inherent weakness in the notion that … 
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there's something called “being gay” that's kind of an 
absolute category, that you tick these boxes. 
… 
So much our society determines who are gay, in the 
names that we were called at primary school. But what 
does this mean, in terms of, there's no inherent 
meaning. 
 
As can be seen, for some gay Christians the question of names and categories is 
problematic. 
 
In summary, Christians use a wide range of techniques, practices and discourses to 
construct themselves, some of which are outlined here. The ancient discipline of obedience 
was largely found to be irrelevant for the interview subjects although the idea of 
Christianity as a code-based faith seemed to have resonance. Ancient Greek ideas of the 
self have been partially carried through to today, but subsequent discourses have also been 
important in modifying the Christian self. Several techniques of Christian self-
transformation were discussed. I now consider one technique in particular, the practice of 
attending a church. 
 
 
7.2 The Practice of Churchgoing (Why Go To Church?) 
 
A key question asked at least once in each interview was, ―Why do you stay in the 
Christian church?‖ or ―Why do you go to church?‖ There was variety in the replies, but 
there was also a great deal of consistency. A number of the men gave more than one reason 
for attending church. I sum up their answers in three reasons for attending church: 
 
 Reasons of faith 
 Reasons of fellowship 
 Reasons of identity. 
 
In support of these reasons some of the respondents also highlighted values that were 
Chapter 7 
 
103 
 
important to them, such as forgiveness or the desire to help others. These are described 
below. 
 
Reasons of Faith. 
When asked why they attended church some respondents gave the reason as their faith, 
belief or connection to God. In other words, their beliefs in themselves were important to 
them and motivated church attendance. Trevor, for example, cited ―faith‖ in the face of 
opposition: 
 
Trevor: 
For gay people to go to church they must really have 
faith because there's so much opposition that why would 
they go otherwise? If they didn't have some sort of 
faith. 
 
Trevor also felt that staying in the church in spite of opposition was a core tenet of being 
Christian. Remaining despite opposition also suggests a form of ―resistance‖ to dominating 
(pastoral) power. Kelvin answered the question by talking directly about his beliefs: 
 
Kelvin: 
I have a really strong belief that Christ is my saviour 
and that he died to save me. And that he sent the Holy 
Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is there to guide me. And 
there are lots of things in my life that I think have 
proved that. So yeah, I have a really strong belief 
that Christ died for me and that Christianity is... 
[pause] I honestly can’t say whether Christianity is 
the only faith, but I certainly believe that it is the 
faith for me. 
 
To reiterate, these beliefs were given as the response to a question asking why he attended 
church. Harry also answered this question by talking about his beliefs: 
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Harry: 
I’ve never lost my faith in God and what I’ve been able 
to do to some degree, up until this point, is put 
myself as a gay person on this side, as a Christian 
person on this side, see them as two halves. How 
successfully I’ve integrated those I don’t know and 
therefore my attendance at [Gay Church] is quite an 
important part of that for me. 
 
As well as his faith in God, Harry valued church attendance to help him integrate his gay 
and Christian identity. I equate faith with the concept of ―belief‖ developed in chapter six: 
Belief both expresses knowledge/power and is also a practice. Attributing religious belief 
as a ―reason‖ for action may seem strange; it may be helpful to recall Hunt‘s (2002: 90) 
advice that sociologists attempt to understand believers‘ perspectives on religious grounds 
first (see chapter four). It was clear that for a number of the men interviewed, ―belief‖ was 
an important reason for attending church. 
 
Reasons of Fellowship. 
The reason of fellowship, community or participation in a shared journey is another reason 
a number gave for attending church. When asked why he attended church, Bruce said: 
 
Bruce: 
Because that’s part of who I am. That’s part of my 
belief system. … And to fellowship with likeminded 
people. I also think it’s a cop out to say, Oh I’m a 
Christian but I don’t go to church. Because it’s not 
just for me that I go, but there might be something I 
can do for someone else. 
 
Bruce added a particular value to fellowship– by being there he might be able to help 
someone else. In fact, Bruce mentioned all three reasons described above: Identity (―that‘s 
part of who I am‖), belief (―that‘s part of my belief system‖) and fellowship (―to 
fellowship with likeminded people‖). Dave said: 
 
Chapter 7 
 
105 
 
Dave: 
We’re on a sort of shared journey and I like that. Our 
Christianity. There’s a humility to it and there’s an 
ability for trying and failing as well. 
 
Dave appreciated the ―shared journey‖, and, like Trevor, also valued mutual forgiveness 
and humility, acknowledging that church members made mistakes. Colin expressed the 
importance of fellowship in a desire to recapture the warmth of his teenage church 
experience: 
 
Colin: 
I go to church for fellowship. And to keep me connected 
with God. … I guess there’s a part of me that will 
always be searching for that sense of belonging. 
[Speaking of his teenage years,] I felt very happy, 
very part of the church, very fulfilled. Very alive. 
That wonderful fellowship. 
 
There may also be a faith element here in his phrase ―to keep me connected with God‖. 
Like some others, Edward‘s answer showed a combination of the importance of his beliefs 
and the value of fellowship. Scott valued community, saying he understood Christianity to 
be ―a communal faith‖ and, as noted below, church-based rituals were also very important 
to him. 
 
When asked why he attended church Adam replied, 
 
 Adam: 
Same reason as everyone else [laughs]. 
 
For me it's really just being with likeminded people, 
for that support, the community. It is really about 
doing things together as a group where you're actually 
in a supportive community. That's why I go to church, 
that's the only reason. 
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Collectively all of these participants sought a strong and supportive community through 
their church. The idea of communities of friends was raised in chapter five; as Webb 
(2003) suggests, friends are those with whom we share the practice of becoming who we 
are. In the same way a supportive community of likeminded people helped the participants 
become who they are. 
 
Reasons of Identity. 
Several participants, including some already quoted, answered that attending church was 
part of their personal identity or self. Mike concluded his answer with the words: 
 
Mike: 
So, why did I stay? Because it was where I wanted to 
be. Because it’s me. 
 
Thus, among other reasons staying in church expressed his sense of identity– ―because it‘s 
me.‖ My sense is that Mike was replying particularly in relation to his fifty-year role as an 
Anglican priest. When John was asked, ―Why did you continue with church participation 
[through the hard times]?‖ he replied: 
 
 John: 
Because that's my identity. Because in the end God 
helped me through this stuff. 
 
Later, he added: 
 
I stay because I can't connect to God just by myself. 
Part of that connection is living and expressing faith 
with others. Part of that vital life is the kind of 
giving side, and also the being corrected side. 
 
Here we see reasons both of identity and of fellowship (―living and expressing faith with 
others‖). As an aside, John‘s comment on ―being corrected‖ by others could be viewed in 
the Foucauldian sense of ―discipline‖, a thought I do not have space to pursue further. 
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Finally, church meetings can be seen as facilitator of certain practices. Some practices, for 
example the Eucharist, can only be performed in a church setting. An ―expository‖ sermon, 
as mentioned by Edward above, is usually only experienced in a church meeting. In the 
context of a church service, prayer, ―sharing‖, and the Eucharist were important to some of 
the men interviewed: 
 
Harry: 
The Eucharist service itself, the sharing, the way 
which communion is shared is incredibly meaningful. 
 
Scott also mentioned the importance of the Eucharist and said: 
 
Scott: 
The church does provide ritual which helps me 
personally to engage. … Those ritual ideas and 
practices are really useful and helpful. 
 
Rituals are another example of techniques or practices which can occur only in the context 
of church attendance. 
 
In conclusion, I have suggested that the modern Christian subject incorporates both the 
Antique focus on self-transformation and a relation to an Other. Churchgoing can be used 
as a technique to achieve this mode of being. Church attendance may also have links with 
other Foucauldian ideas, for example attending church in spite of opposition can be seen as 
a form of resistance. 
 
While there were nuances within the data, the men interviewed for this study stay within 
the Christian church as openly gay men for a combination of three main reasons. Reasons 
of faith prioritise belief as knowledge/power and practice. Fellowship and community as 
sources of support were also reasons given for church attendance. Thirdly, some expressed 
a sense of personal identity through their church attendance. Thus, the men interviewed in 
this research attended church for faith, for fellowship, and for identity.
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8 
Conclusion 
 
 
“There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently 
than one thinks… is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at 
all.” 
– Foucault, HS2: 8 
 
“I kind of feel that God loves me no matter what. But I‟m not sure about church 
sometimes, whether it‟s the same message.” 
– Trevor, one of the men interviewed for this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I heard of the existence of ―out‖ gay Christians I was intrigued. I wondered what 
they get out of religious faith, and how they create themselves as gay and Christian. I 
wondered why they still attended church. After all, New Zealand society has undergone 
significant social changes in the last thirty years but Christian churches are still difficult 
places to be openly gay. To answer these questions I interviewed twelve men who 
identified as both gay and Christian, and who regularly attended a Christian church
31
. 
 
Those interviewed attended a mixture of protestant churches including some churches that 
have traditionally been regarded as conservative. These men had reconciled and integrated 
their gay and Christian identities (Ganzevoort et al, 2011: 219). This is not to deny that 
these research participants faced unique difficulties. Almost universally the men 
interviewed spoke of the opposition they faced and of highly unpleasant experiences in 
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 As noted in chapter five, one of these men no longer attends church or considers himself 
Christian. 
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church settings. However, in this research I have sought to tell a positive story of their 
lives, an ideal supported by Michel Foucault‘s ideas concerning productive power. 
 
In many ways this project has been about finding ways to ―think differently‖ about 
religion, as Foucault‘s comment above suggests. Foucault‘s work was used as the 
theoretical base from which to derive themes in the interview transcripts. Foucault has 
been little used in the sociology of religion and I hope this research will contribute 
positively to the field. From a Foucauldian viewpoint, I have suggested that religion is an 
apparatus– comprised of institutions such as churches, and discourses, bound together in 
relations of power/knowledge. Within this apparatus, people are both constructed by 
religious discourses and use techniques of the self to construct for themselves a religious 
self. 
 
The interview transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis, which seeks to identify 
patterns in the data. Specifically, the analysis was theoretically driven mainly by 
Foucault‘s work. Having said this, some themes were developed directly from the data and 
so it would be correct to say the themes were formulated using both inductive (―bottom 
up‖) and theoretical (―top down‖) methodologies. 
 
I was often struck by the richness of the data. This meant that I was usually only able to 
include a selection of the men‘s comments. Theoretical thematic analysis tends to provide 
a more detailed analysis of particular aspects of the data rather than a full description of 
the overall data. However, there was also a significant degree of overlap between different 
interview subjects. 
 
Summary Of Results. 
Three resulting themes have been explored in this thesis: 
 
1. Belonging and Exclusion 
2. Belief, Knowledge, Power 
3. The Care of the Christian Self. 
 
Under Belonging and Exclusion, a common sub-theme for many participants was the value 
of support from other people. This led to a discussion of friendship, noting the 
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development in some groups of friendship-based ―communities of choice‖. Foucault was 
discovered to be ―quite insistent on the value of friendship for the gay community‖ 
(Roach, 2005: 58), a claim which is supported from the transcripts in this study. 
―Community‖ was another term of belonging used by some participants, describing a set 
of social relations where participants have a common sense of identity. Giorgio Agamben‘s 
concept of a ―coming community‖ with no mutually shared identity was introduced. While 
I consider this a useful lens through which gay Christian communities may be viewed, the 
idea of a community which has erased all distinctions may not be welcomed by those to 
whom their identity is important. 
 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the inclusion of gay Christians in church life, it was 
also important to acknowledge participants‘ stories of exclusion. Georg Simmel‘s concept 
of the stranger was used to illuminate gay Christians‘ experiences of being both inside and 
outside the Church. Such exclusion can also lead to the idea of otherness. In Christian 
discourse a gay Christian is seen as an alterity, an ―other‖ which resists normalisation. My 
interpretation suggests it is usual for Christians to assume other Christians are 
heterosexual. In fact, as some participants indicated, both gay and Christian communities 
regard ―gay Christians‖ as deviant. 
 
Turning to Belief, Knowledge, Power, I noticed that the word ―belief‖ came up regularly in 
the interviews and began to consider how Foucault might interpret this concept. This 
developed in a ―bottom-up‖ or inductive way into the sub-theme of belief as 
knowledge/power. Knowledge is defined by analytic philosophers as ―justified true belief‖ 
(Elder-Vass, 2012: 209). I considered that if knowledge can be considered a form of belief, 
then beliefs must be considered part of the Foucauldian knowledge/power circuit. 
However, belief is not merely intellectual assent to doctrine. Belief was also shown to be a 
volitional experience. Hence I suggest that, rightly understood, belief can also be a form of 
Foucauldian ―practice‖. 
 
I also proposed that the knowledge gay Christians hold is a subjugated knowledge. These 
subjugated knowledges can be expressed in ―parrhesia‖ (truth telling) and also contribute 
to ―resistance‖. Parrhesia can be translated ―to speak boldly‖ and implies the obligation to 
speak the truth, even at personal risk. Several participants discussed situations where they 
had to speak their truth (parrhesia) to those embodying greater power in the Church. 
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 The sub-theme of religion and productive power relations largely developed using a ―top-
down‖ methodology. This section discussed personal empowerment and also participants‘ 
experience of God as productive rather than dominating. Where interviewees had been 
excluded by churches they made a distinction between human actions and God‘s actions. 
Church attendance in the face of opposition was interpreted as ―resistance‖ in some cases. 
However, while I think the empowerment of resistance is a valid interpretation of the data, 
resistance should not be over-emphasised against participants‘ experience of churches‘ 
dominating power. 
 
The final theme, The Care of the Christian Self, focused on subjectivity; Foucault‘s 
concept of ―techniques of the self‖ was used to theorise the data. Foucault says these 
techniques operate on ―souls‖, and that through such self transformation one might attain 
―supernatural power‖ (Foucault, 1980a: 162). These transformations are usually associated 
with Foucault‘s (HS2, HS3) study of the pre-Christian Greek ―ethics of the self‖. However, 
Foucault also studied another set of self-forming techniques, which I have termed the 
Christian ethics of the code. This ethic focuses on obedience to pastoral power. 
Significantly, the concept of obedience was largely irrelevant for the men studied here. I 
suggest this is mainly because Foucault focused on early Christianity; since that time other 
discourses and practices may have been incorporated in the Christian ―apparatus‖. One 
aspect of Foucault‘s interpretation did seem relevant, namely the idea that Christianity is a 
code-based faith. However, even here the data indicated that not every modern Christian is 
focused on morality in this way. The data also illustrated several techniques of Christian 
self-transformation including support group meetings, use of the Bible, attendance at 
church services, involvement in social activism, and prayer. 
 
The motivating question for this study asks why these gay men attended church, hence this 
practice was analysed in greater detail. From the transcripts three main reasons emerged 
for church attendance: 
 
 Reasons of faith 
 Reasons of fellowship 
 Reasons of identity. 
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By ―reasons of faith‖ I mean that participants‘ beliefs were important to them. Part of these 
beliefs included the value of participating in a church. In addition, church meetings are 
usually the only setting in which some practices, such as the Eucharist, may be performed. 
The second reason for church attendance was the desire for fellowship, or connection with 
others. All of those interviewed sought a strong experience of community through their 
church. Thirdly, several participants answered that attending church was part of their 
identity. My sense is that in most respects gay Christians attend church for the same 
reasons as non-gay Christians. Adam hinted at this when asked why he attended church: 
 
Adam: 
Same reason as everyone else [laughs]. 
 
In summary, the gay Christian men studied here incorporated both the Antique focus on 
self-transformation and a relation to an ―Other‖. Their churchgoing was used as one 
technique to achieve a religious mode of being. 
 
 
Evaluation and Future Directions. 
In a sense Foucault‘s method is simply to undertake an extended meditation on modes of 
thought and practices elicited from data. Carol Grbich (2004:39) suggests the actual 
experience of analysis is an important component of Foucauldian method. From my 
experiences of undertaking Foucauldian analysis thus far I concur that, while time-
consuming, it is a highly rewarding exercise. 
 
It is important to ask: How useful was Foucault? There were times when I wrestled with 
issues both theoretically and personally. Firstly, I wondered how useful these ideas might 
be for the participants‘ self understanding– perhaps Foucault‘s theoretically based 
approach was too esoteric? I questioned whether Foucault‘s theories reduce people to mere 
discourses (as I have shown in chapter three, they do not). I worried that I might be 
ignoring important themes in what the men were saying, in favour of trying to see through 
Foucault‘s eyes. Conversely, from a purely academic point of view, I then wondered if the 
research should be useful to the participants. Perhaps I should simply be satisfied with 
contributing to knowledge? In the course of interviewing and writing I came to a sense of 
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peace over these questions. I came to believe that, if I have succeeded in my interpretation, 
then the use of Foucault‘s work is relevant and respectful to the men concerned.  
 
Secondly, given the almost universal neglect of Foucault in this field, I wondered how 
useful Foucault would turn out to be for the sociology of religion. As it turned out, I came 
out the other side convinced that Foucault is very much of use in the sociology of religion. 
Carrette (2000: 142) believes that most of Foucault‘s writing on religion was a negative 
critique. However, as the arguments here present some aspects of religion as a positive 
power, I think this need not always be the case. 
 
There is scope for further research, both in studying gay Christians and also in applying 
Foucault to sociology of religion. Due to the limitations of  using interview data a number 
of specific practices were identified, but were not able to be analysed in depth, for example 
practices of prayer, use of the Bible, and rituals like the Eucharist. Other methodologies 
such as participant observation might yield more insight in this area. Several participants 
had adult children, and one noted that ―coming out‖ also meant his children had to ―come 
out‖ as having a gay Father. Some of these children also attended Christian churches– the 
subject of Christian children of gay parents would be a fruitful area for research. 
 
While I hope I have developed a little insight in the Foucauldian sociology of religion, 
there are still many areas to be developed further. Chapter six, for example, suggested a 
study on Foucault‘s use of the term ―soul‖. One development in Foucauldian scholarship is 
the idea that belief is a form of practice which is ―inscribed‖ or reflected in the physical 
body (Voyce, 2009: 5). According to Carrette (2000), Foucault subverts the conventional 
Western dualism between spirit and body. Foucault‘s view of the body and its impact on 
religion were not able to be included in this study. This too is an area which would reward 
further study. 
 
Conclusion. 
During the writing of this thesis two events occurred which are significant for gay 
Christians in New Zealand. Firstly, the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 
(2013) was enacted into law by the New Zealand parliament. This means that gay 
Christians now have the option of full legal marriage, an enormous milestone which is 
viewed with suspicion by many Christians. Secondly, in June 2013 Exodus International 
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closed (Stuff, 2013). Exodus was the umbrella organisation for many ―ex-gay‖ ministries 
worldwide, and two of the men interviewed for this study had formerly been heavily 
involved with similar New Zealand ―ex-gay‖ groups. At the time of writing it is unclear 
whether a new organisation created from the former Exodus will retain some beliefs which 
gay Christians have objected to, such as the idea that homosexuality is inherently sinful. 
Nevertheless, this is a significant development. Meanwhile, alternative gay Christian 
groups were already established. For example, a New Zealand website states, ―Gay 
Christian Alliance is a group of gay Christians living in New Zealand who wish to spread 
the message that it‘s OK to be gay and Christian‖ (Gay Christian Alliance, 2011). 
 
Some New Zealand ―fundamentalists‖, argue that lesbians and gay men want the 
normalisation of same-sex relationships. However, these opponents have not realised that 
queer communities have already succeeded significantly in achieving ―normalisation‖ 
(Young, 2004: 54)
32
. Kelvin, who attended a Salvation Army church, spoke of the desire to 
be normal: 
 
Kelvin: 
I just want to go to a normal church, because that’s 
what I want to be, just a normal person. 
 
Are the majority of churches likely to become more accepting of gay Christians? Some of 
the men I interviewed felt this would occur ―in the next 20 years‖; others thought this 
would be much longer in coming, if ever. It would be helpful to know how many gay 
Christians are out there. As indicated in the Lavender Islands study (Henrickson, 2007) 
numbers of those in the church who are gay, whether openly or otherwise, are higher than 
might be expected. Interview commentary in the current study indicated that if the Church 
was more positive towards gays there would be greater numbers who would want to return 
to the faith they were brought up in. Most of the interviewees believed that there are many 
more gay Christians in New Zealand, whether ―out‖ or not, and that more support from the 
Church would be beneficial. Kelvin said: 
 
My partner Colin and I have been together 27 years. And 
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 Young is using ―normalisation‖ in a different sense to that of Foucault. 
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a lot of straight couples haven’t been together 27 
years. And I honestly think if the Church gave the gay 
community that opportunity… I mean they say that they 
won’t support gay marriage for example. Well how do 
they expect gay couples to not be promiscuous if they 
don’t give them the chance to be together. If they gave 
them that opportunity and supported them, maybe their 
lives would change. 
 
And: 
 
Getting gay people into church is probably a [big] task 
sometimes. Because they see Christians as people who 
hate them. 
 
Ellison (2009: 4) references a recent US survey of 6000 church youth where 9% identified 
as homosexual or bisexual. Anecdotes from the interviewees in this study, from informal 
information gathered from the internet, and from academic publications, indicate that the 
percentage of gay men attending conservative churches without publicly revealing their 
sexuality may be much higher than might be expected. However, what is revealed in this 
study is the small but significant number of gay men who are now willing to be ―out‖ and 
attend a conservative church. To return one last time to Foucault, if discourses ask ―What 
may be said?‖, we may ask, ―What is being said by gay Christians?‖ Up until recently in 
Western Christianity, gay men could not speak. Now, perhaps, ―I am a gay Christian‖ can 
be said.
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10 
Appendix 
 
 
This appendix contains the information that was given to participants for their informed 
consent under the ethics approval from Victoria University of Wellington (#19413, 28 
August 2012).  Section 9.4 below contains the example questions that interviews were 
based around. 
 
 
10.1 Letter of Introduction 
 
Dear  [Name] 
 
Hi, my name is Jonathan and I‘m interested in social aspects of Christianity. 
 
I am currently undertaking research towards a Masters degree in Sociology. The issue I am 
interested in is how Christian gay men ―create‖ themselves and why they stay within the 
Christian church. (I understand that some of the men I talk to may prefer not to use the 
term ―gay‖ to describe themselves.) 
 
I wish to talk with men who identify as both gay and Christian, and who regularly attend a 
Christian church about the following topics: 
 
- current religious beliefs and practices. 
 
- experience of ―coming out‖ to oneself and the Church (if applicable). 
 
- whether Christian gays have experienced exclusion or inclusion by Christian 
organisations. 
- how a sense of self-power or empowerment is developed by gay Christians. 
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My interest is in your religious experiences and beliefs.  I will not ask questions about your 
sexual behaviour or love life. 
 
It is important to me to respect and value participants so confidentiality is guaranteed. If 
you‘re interested in participating or talking with me further, please read the information 
sheet attached.  You can email me at [email address] or I am happy to telephone you. 
 
Kind Regards 
 
 
 
Jonathan Beazer 
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10.2 Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet for Research Project 
“Why Do Gay Christians Go To Church?” 
 
Approval 
 
This research has been approved by the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University  
(Research project number 19413, approved 28 August 2012). The project will be carried 
out according to these guidelines under the oversight of my supervisor, Dr Rhonda Shaw 
(contact details below). 
 
Dr Rhonda Shaw 
email: [email address] 
[telephone number] 
 
The Interview 
 
I wish to make an audio recording of our discussion. The interview can be temporarily or 
completely halted at any time and you are free to query any questions if they are unclear. If 
you are not happy about a question you do not need to answer it. You may bring a support 
person with you to the interview if you wish. 
 
I expect the interview to take around 1.5 hours depending on your needs. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
The electronic recording of the interview will be kept in a password protected file.  A 
transcription (written version of the audio) will be made. This will also be kept in a 
password protected file. The material will be kept securely for 36 months. After this period 
the data and transcriptions will be destroyed.  All personal identifying information in the 
transcription, for example, your name, place names, names of churches and names of 
workplaces, will be removed from the thesis and any possible subsequent published 
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material. 
 
I will provide you with a copy of your transcript if you want it, and I would welcome any 
additional comments or additions in relation to it. Any amendments, either additions or 
deletions, to the original transcript will be made available to you should you request this. 
 
You may withdraw from the project up to one month after your interview. 
 
Transcription By An Assistant 
 
I will transcribe the interview myself.  However if I have time constraints I may have an 
assistant transcribe the interview for me.  They will sign a confidentiality agreement, and 
once they have completed transcription will destroy their copy of the data. If you do not 
wish them to listen to the interview I will transcribe it myself. 
 
Use of the Data 
 
The results will be used in a 40,000 word Masters thesis to be completed in March 2013. 
 
It is possible, though unlikely, that my supervisor may ask to see the transcriptions. She 
will only see the changed transcription, not the original. An academic external examiner 
from another university will also mark the thesis but not see the transcripts. 
 
I will probably wish to present the results at a sociology conference and publish them in an 
academic journal article one day.  I am also seeking your permission to allow this.  I will 
contact you with the details of publication if and when this occurs. 
 
Feedback on the research 
 
If you want, once the project is complete, I will send you a summary of the results. Once 
marked, the full thesis will be available electronically from the Victoria University library. 
I am happy to discuss the results at any time with you. 
 
I you wish to participate in the project I will ask you to sign a consent form which 
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summarises the above. If any of the above is unclear or unacceptable, please contact me at 
[email address]  I am also happy to discuss this via telephone at [telephone number]. 
 
 
 
 
Jonathan Beazer 
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10.3 Consent Form 
 
Consent Form (Confidential) 
 
Why Do Gay Christians Go To Church? 
 (Victoria University Project 19413) 
 
Consent 
 
I have read the information sheet for this research.  I give my informed consent to (please 
tick): 
 
Allow the researcher Jonathan Beazer to record an interview with me.
Allow an assistant to transcribe the data, after which the assistant‘s copy of the data 
will be destroyed.
Allow Jonathan to use the data in his research thesis.
Allow Jonathan to present the results at a sociology conference, and publish the 
results in an academic journal.  I understand that I will be informed of the details.
Allow the data to be securely kept for three years from March 25th 2013, after 
which the data and transcriptions will be destroyed.
I understand that Jonathan will seek my permission if he wishes to use the data in 
any other way. 
 
Feedback on the research:
I wish to be sent my transcript for editing.
I wish to be sent a summary of the results. 
 
If you wish to receive transcript or results, please include a postal address or email 
address: 
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 _______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Signed __________________________________________ 
 
 
Name ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Date ____________________________________________ 
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10.4 Interview Themes 
 
Why Do Gay Christians Go To Church? Foucault and Religion 
 
Proposed Topic Guide 
 
Interviews will be semi-structured, so that questions may be asked in a different order or 
phrased in a different way according to how the conversation evolves.  This is not a script, 
but a guide to question themes. Actual questions may change. 
 
[BACKGROUND INFORMATION, ESTABLISHING RAPPORT] 
 
1. Greetings, introduction of the interview, checking informed consent. 
 
Interviewees will be reminded that no questions asking for personal information about 
sexual behaviour or relationships with partners will be asked. The focus of this research is 
on religion, not sexuality.  Sometimes I will repeat questions in a different way, to get a 
different angle on things. 
 
2. Tell me briefly about your family growing up? 
 
3. When did you start going to church? 
 
4. How many churches have you attended since? What prompted changing churches (if 
applicable)? 
 
5. Apart from going to church, what kind of practices do you have as a Christian? For 
example, do you pray, do you attend any groups apart from church meetings? Do you read 
Christian literature? 
 
6. Have you ever considered leaving the church? Tell me about that. 
 
7. When did you start to consider your identity in relation to your faith? 
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[EXCLUSION] 
 
8. Have you ever revealed your orientation to a church or christian group? What kind of 
opposition or support did you experience? 
 
9. Have you ever felt excluded, or included in the church?  Tell me about that. 
 
10. (If they encountered opposition) So, why did you continue with church participation? 
 
(10b. Have you experienced other occasions when there were tensions between your 
sexuality and your faith? Can you describe them?) 
 
[KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF]   
 
11. How would you describe your theological beliefs now? For example, are you a Bible 
believer, are you a mystic, are you pentecostal? Has it changed at all since you first came 
out? 
 
12. What do you consider your ultimate source of truth for your life? For example, 
yourself, the Bible, church traditions, church leadership... ? 
 
[POSITIVE POWER, EMPOWERMENT, RESISTANCE] 
 
13. What do you see as being most important in empowering you or helping you in terms 
of being christian and gay? 
 
14.  Is there any community you feel you belong to? 
 
15. While we are on the theme of power, do you have any thoughts about God as a 
―power‖ in your life? 
 
16. Has there been a time where you have spoken out  (parrhesia) about something?  Or, 
putting it another way, has there been a time when you have expressed resistance to those 
Appendix 
 
146 
 
in power? 
 
17. I‘ve asked you this earlier, but can you clarify for me again why you stay in the 
Church? 
 
18. Is there anything else you want to say that we haven‘t touched on? Is there anything 
you want to say a little more about? 
 
Thankyou. 
 
